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HE Uruguay Round negotiations included three 'new' agenda items -
trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs); trade-related investment
measures (TRIMs); and services - that had not been covered explicitly in pre-
vious GATT negotiations. While services issues have attracted a good deal of
analytical attention, this is much less the case forTRIPs and TRIMs. In an effort to
further the understanding of TRIPs and TRIMs, a study group was organised in
1988 to address the important issues. This effort was supported in part by grants
from the Canadian Donner Foundation to the Centre for the Study of International
Economic Relations of the University of Western Ontario and the Ford Foundation
to the Institute of Public Policy Studies of the University of Michigan.
Besides myself, the original members of the study group included Alan V.
Deardorff (University of Michigan), Keith E. Maskus (University of Colorado),
Rachel McCulloch (Brandeis University), and Deborah Hurley (OECD Secreta-
riat). The members of the study group had the benefit of discussing their work in
progress at a one-day meeting convened in Washington, D.C. in April 1989. This
meeting included several staff economists from US Government agencies and the
World Bank as well as some economists from universities in the Washington area
and from the Institute for International Economics. Many useful comments were
obtained from those present.
We had planned originally to publish the study group papers in book form, but
changes in commitments of some of those involved made this infeasible. It was
decided accordingly to publish four of the study group papers as a symposium in
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The World Economy. The papers on TRIPs include one by Alan V. Deardorff and
another by Arvind Subramanian (GAT'Secretariat) which was specially commis-
sioned for the symposium, and papers on TRIMs by Rachel McCulloch and Keith
E. Maskus. As an aid to the reader, it may be useful to summarise some of the main
points that are made in these symposium papers.
In his paper on TRIPs, Deardorff discusses the welfare effects of extending
patent protection to parts of the world where it is not now provided. Such extension
of patent protection is one of the objectives of the larger negotiations on TRIPs in
the Uruguay Round. Deardorff argues, based in part on a theoretical model which
is elaborated in a separate paper, that extending patent protection to all countries of
the world is unlikely to be globally optimal. He suggests instead that at least the
poorest of developing countries should be exempted for this process.
This conclusion is based on considerations of both equity and efficiency. Ex-
tending patent protection to a country that does not now provide it, but enjoys free
access to the products of invention elsewhere, creates several benefits for the part
of the world where the invention takes place. These include both increased mon-
opoly profits and access to additional invented goods. In the country to which
patent protection is extended, however, while there is the benefit of additional
inventions, there are also costs in the form of monopoly profits paid to inventors
and distortion of consumer choice due to monopoly pricing. If patent protection
were extended to all countries of the world, Deardorff argues that these costs would
outweigh the benefits from the world point of view, so that global patent protection
should be rejected on efficiency grounds. Further, since patent protection also
involves a substantial transfer of welfare from the developing towards the de-
veloped world, equity considerations suggest that it should be the poorest of
developing countries which are exempted from extended patent protection.
In his companion paper on TRIPs, Subramanian traces the evolution of intellec-
tual property (IP) as a trade issue. He notes the developed country disappointment
with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in providing for greater
IP protection and the hope that the GATT would become a more effective vehicle
for such protection. At the same time, he observes that US [P-related actions have
been initiated bilaterally against several developing countries under Section 301 of
the US trade law, with the consequence that the multilateral process has been
bypassed and possibly undermined.
The TRIPs negotiations in the Uruguay Round concern such issues as standards
or norms of IP protection, enforcement, basic principles such as most-favoured
nation and national treatment, dispute settlement, and transitional arrangements for
developing countries. While the developed countries have some interests in com-
mon in the TRIPs negotiations, Subramanian argues that the issues are best viewed
from a North-South perspective, with high tech, luxury goods, and entertainment
industries in the developed countries pursuing an IP agenda designed to protect
what they view as their rights.
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Subramanian analyses the welfare consequences of higher IP protection from
the national and global standpoints, using a framework similar to Deardorff's. He
contends that the most empirically plausible situation is one in which there is a
small developing country that is capable of copying the technology or products for
which IP protection is being sought. He notes in this case that there is a congruence
of producing and consuming interests in countries where imitation is possible, and
that, since the countries are small, IP protection is not needed insofar as there is
unlikely to be a detrimental effect on R&D in the developed countries. He
concedes that a case can be made for greater IP protection when there is a large
country, a need to protect the transfer of technology, or discrimination in favour of
domestic producers. Nonetheless, there is a distinct possibility that higher IP
protection could reduce global welfare and have adverse distributional consequen-
ces. By including TRIPs in the Uruguay Round negotiations, there was a
possibility of designing tradeoffs to compensate developing countries that might be
adversely affected by granting greater IP protection. But it appears, according to
Subramanian, that US bilateral actions may have preempted the potentially suc-
cessful workings of the GATT multilateral process.
In her paper on TRIMs, McCulloch notes that there has been increasing use of
investment policies that have combined incentive measures with operating restric-
tions on investment. This complex of investment policies is intimately bound up
with questions of national sovereignty and wiTi strategic decision-making on the
part of imperfectly competitive multinational firms. The TRIMs negotiations in the
Uruguay Round are ostensibly focused on the trade effects of investment policies.
But McCulloch argues that the empirical evidence on the trade distorting effects of
the investment policies is by no means clear, and, further, that the policies are
complicated dependingon whether they have an impact on the distribution of rents
between firms and host countries or the allocation of resources in production and
trade. She concludes therefore that the TRIMs negotiations may be too narrowly
conceived, and that national investment policies need to be addressed in their own
right either in GAIT or in some alternative forum.
Maskus and Eby also note the complexity of the policy objectives and defini-
tions of TRIMs and the consequent difficulties that may be encountered in
achieving a multilateral agreement on TRIMs in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The difficulties arise from the fact that while many of the developed countries seek
to improve the access of their domestic firms to foreign markets, host developing
countries are at the same time straining to protect themselves from perceived loss
of sovereignty and from restrictive business practices which may accompany
inward direct investment. Granted all of this, Maskus and Eby argue in favour of a
limited agreement on TRIMs which would have somewhat narrow coverage and
limited country membership. Their hope is that this would serve to sensitise GATT
members to the harmful welfare consequences of TRIMs and possibly lead to
further negotiations and liberalisation.
Maskus and Eby note that them are narrow and broad definitions of TRIMs, with
the spectrum including: (1) local content requirements; (2) export performance
requirements; (3) trade-balancing requirements; (4) product mandating; (5) do-
mestic sales requirements; (6) manufacturing limitations; (7) technology transfer
and licensing requirements; (8) remittance limitations; (9) local equity require-
ments; and (10) investment incentives. It is important to distinguish both the direct
and indirect trade impacts of TRIMs, which is unfortunately difficult to accom-
plish. Nonetheless, they argue that there is ample justification for international
concern since TRIMs are imposed in an often arbitrary and discriminatory manner
and without adequate political controls. If an agreement'on TRIMs is possible, it
should recognise the pertinence of a number of the existing GATT articles, the
need for new GATT disciplines and procedures, and provide for the special
circumstances and interests of developing countries. Perhaps the most realistic
outcome of the Uruguay Round is for a TRIMs code that would have strong
disciplines for the signatory nations and yet provide incentives for others to join
eventually as the benefits of greater and more efficient international investment
could become available to them.
These symposium papers on TRIPs and TRIMs are by no means the last word
on the subjects. Nonetheless, they should prove valuable insofar as they clarify
many important analytical and negotiating issues and problems that have arisen in
the context of the Uruguay Round negotiations and no doubt will continue to be
addressed in the future.
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HE Uruguay Round has extended the scope of GATT multilateral trade
negotiations well beyond the tariffs that had occupied most previous negotia-
tions.' In additiQn to various non tariff barriers (which had also been dealt with to
a degree in the Tokyo Round, as discussed in Deardorff and Stem 1983 and 1986),
the Uruguay Round dealt with issues of trade in services, international investment,
and intellectual property. Since these 'new issues' have conceptually quite differ-
ent characteristics than the tariffs of previous negotiations, it is appropriate to
examine them afresh to determine whether the objectives of the Uruguay Round
negotiations can be considered economically sound. This paper describes such an
analysis for a particular aspect of the intellectual property negotiations - patent
rights - and in the process voices some skepticism about this aspect of the
Uruguay Round's objectives.
Inclusion of 'Trade Related Intellectual Property' issues, or TRIPs, in the
Uruguay Round agenda was done largely at the insistence of the United States.
Firms in the United States have long been concerned that their position at the
cutting edge of technological progress was being eroded by unauthorised copying
of their intellectual property elsewhere in the world. While export of such 'copied'
products back into the United States might be restricted under US law, this would
provide little help in competition with the 'pirate' firms in third-country markets.
ALAN V. DEARDORFF is Professor of Economics and Public Policy in the Department of
Economics and Institute of Public Policy Studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
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And it would provide no help at all in the countries of the copying firms them-
selves, since these countries typically have not honoured or enforced US concepts
of intellectual property rights. Therefore there has been a sizable US constituency
in favour of extending US ideas of intellectual property to therest of the world. The
negotiations under the Uruguay Round were intended, at least by the United States,
to achieve this objective.
2. SHOULD THE GATT BE INVOLVED?
Early in the debate, there was some question as to whether the GATT was an
appropriate place to raise issues of international intellectual property. These issues
have, since 1970, been under the jurisdiction of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), and many developing countries especially argued that
WIPO should remain their sole arbiter. They feared that under GATT their powers
would be diminished relative to the industrialised countries, which of course was
exactly the reason that the United States and other industrialised countries wanted
to move the issue into GATT. More to the point, it was argued that intellectual
property issues are not directly issues of trade or of trade barriers, and hence they
are not appropriate to the underlying mission of the GATT. It was for this reason
that the Uruguay Round negotiating group was charged to deal, not with intellec-
tual property issues generally, but only with 'trade related' ones, hence TRIPs. In
practice, of course, in an interdependent world economy just about anything is
trade related in some way, and the negotiations have dealt with intellectual
property protection quite generally.
As its name suggests, intellectual property 'protection' is a surprising issue
for the GATT to be dealing with in another way. That is, on issues of commercial
policy, the GATT's mission has always been to prevent, or at least to circumscribe,
countries' efforts to 'protect' their domestic industries. Now, in the TRIPs area, the
GATT is being called upon to extend protection, not restrict it. Of course the
concepts of protection are different in the two cases. Proponents of the TRIPs
negotiations would argue that protection of intellectual property is needed to permit
the owners of that property to export the products that embody their innovations.
Therefore intellectual property protection, despite its name, is said to be pro-trade.
On the other hand, one could also take the view that the GATT's mission has
been to promote the free international flow of goods in trade, and that if that
mission in indeed extended to intellectual property, it should also promote the free
international flow of ideas. From that perspective, again, the goal of the Uruguay
Round negotiations in restricting this free flow may be viewed as perverse.
I should note that proponents of intellectual property protection also argue that
such protection actually enhances the international dissemination of ideas. By
granting and enforcing patent rights internationally, for example, owners of the.1
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patents will no longer be forced to keep the details of their inventions secret, and
indeed they will be forced to make them public as part of their patent applications.
Thus the knowledge itself will indeed be disseminated more freely, not less, and it
is only the use of this knowledge that will be restricted. For the purpose of this
paper, I will assume that access to knowledge without the ability to use it provides
no economic benefit, although I acknowledge that this is not always the case.
2
3. ARE THESE REALLY RIGHTS?
Before turning to a discussion of the costs and benefits of intellectual property
protection, I should first ask whether intellectual property rights are really 'rights',
in the same sense as the basic human rights that modem societies now appropri-
ately defend. If intellectual property rights are human rights in this sense, then the
costs and benefits of protecting them are less of an issue. One might still ask
whether it makes sense to broaden the scope of the GAIT to defend human rights,
but one could agree that some international agency should be charged with the task.
Proponents of intellectual property protection in the industrialised countries
often speak of them in these terms. Just as one is entitled to the fruits of one's
labour - and we therefore outlaw slavery - one is also entitled to the fruits of
one's creative activity. Violators of intellectual property rights are spoken of in
pejorative terms, as pirates, counterfeiters, and thieves. Lobbyists for intellectual
property protection report the economic 'losses' due to the absence of this protec-
tion, measured as the sales that, say, patent owners could have made in countries
without patent protection, without even raising the question of whether they were
in any sense entitled to these sales.3
Yet there are several reasons to be skeptical that intellectual property rights
should enjoy the same status as basic human rights, or even as other property
rights.
First, as is the case with certain other property rights, our conception of intellec-
tual property rights is largely culture specific. In the traditional Chinese culture, for
example, there is nothing onerous about copying another's artistic creation. On the
contrary, copying an artist is the highest compliment one can pay him. As I
understand it, this attitude also carries over to other forms of intellectual property,
such as the written word. I do not know, unfortunately, the traditional Chinese
attitude towards patent rights.
2 For example, if one is engaged in innovation. then knowledge of the details of other innovations
can be quite helpful as a guide to new ones. Since I will be discussing extension of patent protection
to countries where, by assumption, inventive activity is not being undertaken, this consideration will
not arise.
'These 'losses' are often also exaggerated. That is, it may be assumed that all illegal sales replace
legal sales, unit for unit, even though legal sales would presumably be at a higher price and hence a
lower quantity. And the total value of lost sales is typically taken as an economic loss, without
deducting costs.
Second, even in Western culture, rights to intellectual property extend only to
particular forms of creative activity, and as new forms appear they are not automat-
ically covered, but are subject to negotiation. In US law, for example, ideas cannot
be copyrighted. It is only the expression of ideas, in written or other form, that is
protected by copyright, and it is only the embodiment of ideas in physical products
or processes that is protected by patents. Implicitly our culture recognises that not
all creations are the property of their creator. Instead we appear to have determined
which creations to protect, and which not, on more practical grounds.
Similarly, even for those categories of intellectual property that our culture and
our laws do choose to protect, we do not provide that protection in an unlimited
way. This is most obvious in the case of patents, which are granted for only a
limited number of years. Even this number, which is 17 in the United States, differs
from country to country, again presumably on practical grounds. There is surely
nothing in philosophy that would grant an inventor an inalienable right to his
invention for exactly 17 years, and then remove that right completely thereafter.
Instead, implicitly again, we seem to recognise that there are both costs and
benefits associated with patent protection, and that balancing these costs and
benefits requires that we extend patent protection for a while, but not indefinitely.
I will argue that the same sort of tradeoff of costs and benefits may apply
geographically, as well as over time. There are indeed benefits from a certain
amount of patent protection that outweigh their costs, and these benefits suggest
that we grant an inventor an exclusive market for his product. But this exclusive
market need not be unlimited, either in time or in space, in order to generate some
return on the invention, Whether the extent of this market should be limited, or not,
ought to depend on a weighing of the costs and benefits to the world as a whole,
and this calls for the sort of analysis that is described below.
In any case, it seems clear that our society has already accepted the argument
that costs and benefits matter, and that unlimited intellectual property protection is
not an inalienable right. It remains to be seen what these costs and benefits are and
how they may best be balanced.
Costs and benefits matter in two ways. First, taking the perspective of the world
as a whole, if the costs of extending intellectual property protection exceed the
benefits, then extending it is inefficient and should be rejected from a world
welfare point of view. Second, when the incidence of these costs and benefits is not
uniform, with the costs instead being borne disproportionately by one group in
society and the benefits largely accruing to another, then the distributional impli-
cations of extending intellectual property protection should also be considered. I
will argue first that, taking the world point of view, extension of intellectual
property protection to the entire world is inefficient. Therefore, if such protection
is extended beyond the countries that currently provide it, the process should stop
short of covering the entire world. In addition, taking distributional considerations
into account, I will also argue that the appropriate countries to be left out of a
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system of otherwise global intellectual property protection should be the poorest of
developing countries.
I shall restrict attention in the remainder of the paper to patent protection,
leaving aside the other two major categories of intellectual property protection:
copyrights and trade marks. I do this in part for simplicity of exposition. But I also
do it in recognition that the case for these other two forms of protection as
fundamental rights may rest on firmer foundations. Abuse of trademarks, for
example, may be condemned as simply being deceptive, and therefore trademarks
might be defended by law along with other forms of truth in packaging.4 And in a
different sense, we seem to recognise a writer's inherent claim to the product of his
work on a more unlimited basis than a patent, when we grant copyrights that are
renewable for the lifetime of the author.
4. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXTENDING PATENT PROTECTION
If there were no patent rights at all or any other means for an inventor to secure
a return to invention, such as trade secrets or a government subsidy to research,
there would presumably be nothing invented.5 Inventors and the public both would
lose. The inventor would lose the profit that could have been collected from selling
the invention to the public. The public would lose the consumer surplus from
consuming6 or otherwise using the invention.7 Thus, in a sense there are no costs,
and only benefits, to introducing a system of patent protection.
However, once a limited system of patent protection is in place, providing
inventors exclusive rights to sell their inventions to a certain market that is limited
either in time or in space, then there are indeed both costs and benefits to extending
that protection to a larger market. Both arise from the fact that patent rights grant
the patent holder the right to charge a monopoly price, or to collect the rents from
charging such a price by licensing someone else to do so. On the one hand, the
' Or perhaps, this is not so much a matter of fundamental right as just a case where benefits so clearly
outweigh costs.
* I ignore the very real possibilities that inventors do it just for the fun, for the glory, or for the
altruistic motive of benefiting civilisation. Many inventions undoubtedly have appeared for these
reasons, though even these, at the margin, might have been further stimulated by an economic
incentive. Given my purpose of arguing for limitation of patent protection, such motives would only
strengthen my case.
For simplicity of exposition, I will usually assume that the invention is a final good. Inventions of
intermediate inputs and process innovations can be handled similarly, though it is then necessary to
work through the markets of the goods they help to produce to get to the consumer surplus, and there
is the additional possibility of imperfectly competitive downstream producers capturing part of the
surplus. See Chin and Grossman (1990) for an analysis of process innovation that reaches some of the
same conclusions that I describe here.
' Loss to consumers assumes, of course, that the inventor would not have succeeded in pricing as a
perfectly discriminating monopolist, and hence in extracting all of the potential consumer surplus.
monopoly profits add to the incentive to invent, and this will in general lead to a
larger amount of invention taking place. This is a benefit, so long as the level of
invention is already suboptimal, which in general it will be. On the other hand, the
monopoly price distorts consumer choice, and this leads to a suboptimal quantity
of invented goods being consumed. This is a cost, so long as some positive amount
of invention would have taken place without extending the market.
To elaborate a bit, suppose first that there is only a single market, and that patent
rights are granted for all of it. The monopoly profits from serving that market will
induce a certain amount of invention. This will be whatever level of invention will
balance the expected returns, in the form of monopoly profits, against the expected
costs of invention. This situation will be much better than no invention at all, but it
will be less than optimal in two ways. On the one hand, because consumers of the
invented goods pay monopoly prices instead of perfectly competitive prices which
would be lower, they will consume too little of the goods that are invented and will
therefore enjoy less consumer surplus than would have been possible. At the same
time, because consumers do derive some consumer surplus even with monopoly
pricing, the inventing monopolists fail to cam monopoly profits equal to the entire
benefit to society that is generated by their inventions. This may sound only fair,
but it means that their incentive to invent is not as great at the margin as it should
be from society's point of view, and therefore that the level of invention will also
be suboptimal. That is, in a world where a great many potential inventions are
possible, there will be some inventions that could have benefited consumers more
than they cost to invent, but that inventors will not have found it profitable to
pursue.
These two aspects of suboptimality give rise to both the benefit and the cost of
extending patent protection to a larger, or an additional, market. Suppose there is
an additional, call it foreign, market that has not previously granted patent protec-
tion. If the monopolist-inventors had previously also been able to deny potential
producers in that market access to their technology, in part by refusing to sell their
products to the market's consumers, then extending patent protection will create
only benefits, through three different channels. First, foreign consumers gain
access to the new products, which they did not have at all before. Second,
monopolist inventors in the home market gain additional monopoly profits on
foreign sales of the goods they would have invented anyway. Third, these addi-
tional profits expand the return on invention and cause more invention to be
undertaken. These additional inventions generate still more monopoly profit for
inventors, plus additional consumer surplus for consumers in both markets.
Thus, if denial of patent protection in a market also denies to consumers in that
market access to the invented goods, then extending patent protection to the market
is unambiguously welfare improving for everyone. Suppose, however, that this is
not the case. Suppose instead that producers in the protected market do not manage
to keep their technology secret and that a competitive supply of the invented
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products arises instead in the unprotected market. However realistic this possibility
may be -- and I do regard it to be the more likely case - it is surely the case that
motivates most of the firms that have been lobbying for extending intellectual
property protection under the GATT.
In this case of free foreign access to technology, it is still true that extension of
patent protection creates a benefit. If competitive supplies are eliminated in the
newly protected foreign market, then the inventing firms will earn additional
monopoly profits and hence additional return on their inventions. Since, as argued
above, the level of invention was already suboptimal, it follows that the resulting
expansion of invention will increase world welfare. This is the benefit from
extending patent protection to an additional market: the increased profit and
consumer surplus (all positive) in both markets on the goods that are invented only
as a result of extending protection.
There is, however, now also a cost. All of those goods which were available on
the unprotected market previously will now be subject to monopoly pricing, and
this will cause their consumption to be reduced to a suboptimal level.8 As is usual
in the case of monopoly pricing, the loss to these (foreign) consumers exceeds the
gain in monopoly profits to the supplier, and the difference is therefore a dead-
weight loss for the world as a whole.
Finally, as must already be obvious, there is an additional effect of extending
patent protection which is neither a benefit nor a cost from the world's perspective,
but which is undoubtedly more important than either in terms of understanding the
position that countries take on this issue. That effect is the transfer of welfare from
foreign consumers to domestic monopoly-inventors, and it is equal to the monop-
oly profits earned in the presence of patent protection on foreign sales. Even if
neither foreign consumption nor the level of invention were to change in response
to incentives, so that the benefits and costs enumerated above would be zero, this
transfer of welfare could be considerable. It should be considered when one
examines the implications of the policy for income distribution and equity.
5. HOW FAR SHOULD PATENT PROTECTION BE EXTENDED?
Given that there are these costs and benefits to extending patent protection to
additional markets, plus a transfer effect, how far, geographically, should a system
of patent protection extend? The answer might still be that it should cover all
markets in the world, if there were practical obstacles to providing it only over a
limited area.9 However, as the demands of the Uruguay Round make clear, we
* I am considering only the costs that arise when markets function costlessly and efficiently. In
addition there are likely to be various costs of adjustment, as suppliers in the previously unprotected
market must shut down and their workers find other employment.
' For instance, while it might seem reasonable to exempt only the poorest individuals within a given
society from paying the monopoly prices permitted by patents, the difficulties of implementing such
a system would surely be prohibitive.
already have a system in which patent protection is granted in only some countries
of the world, and while that may not be fair or optimal, it certainly does seem to be
workable.
Let us consider first, then, just the costs and benefits of extending patent
protection which were identified above, and ask what these imply, for the world as
a whole, about the optimal geographical scope for patent protection. It is easy to
see, as I will argue in a moment, that as protection is extended to a larger and larger
portion of the world, the marginal benefits of extending it further decline and the
marginal costs increase. Therefore, if the two are equal for some particular extent
of patent protection, then this will be an optimal situation.
To see that the marginal benefits and costs behave in this way, consider the
effect of extending protection to an additional market of some given size. The
benefits from doing so arise entirely from the new inventions that this additional
market will make profitable but which would not have been profitable to invent
with the previous protected market size. The larger the previously protected
market, however, the greater will be the number of inventions already invented,
and the less desirable will be the ones that remain. Hence the marginal benefit
declines.
Similarly, the cost of extending patent protection to this additional market is
some fraction of the consumer surplus generated in this market by the inventions
that would be undertaken anyway. This fraction is the amount by which consumer
surplus declines on these goods when consumers are charged a monopoly price,
minus the monopoly profits that are earned on the goods.10 This is therefore a
deadweight loss to the world as a whole. The size of this fraction depends on the
elasticity of demand for invented goods, and hence on the size of the monopoly
markup, but there is no reason to expect this fraction to decline systematically as
protection is extended. Therefore, as protection is extended further, and as more
and more inventions are therefore stimulated and become subject to this markup,
the deadweight loss due to extending to the additional market will grow.
All of this suggests, therefore, that there will be an optimal geographical extent
of patent protection that need not be the whole world. I have not yet made the case,
however, for it being less than the whole world.
In fact, such a result is not absolutely necessary, as can be seen from a simple
extreme example. Suppose that the constellation of available inventions were such
that there existed no inventions at all that would be profitable to invent for anything
less than the entire world market. But suppose also that there was at least one
invention which would be profitable to invent for the entire world market. That is,
it would become profitable only if the very last consumer in the world were
to With linear demand, this fraction is one quarter. That is, with a switch from competitive to
monopoly pricing in a market with a linear demand curve, three quarters of the previous consumer
surplus is lost to consumers, but two thirds of that loss accrues to the monopolist in the form of profits,
leaving a deadweight loss of one quarter of the competitive consumer surplus. See Deardorff (1990).
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included in the market where a monopoly price could be charged. In that very
special case, there would be no cost to extending protection to cover this last
consumer, and there would be the considerable benefit due to the new invention.
Thus in this extreme case, the optimal geographical scope of patent protection
would indeed be the whole world.
The example is so extreme, however, that it easily suggests why this is not
normally the case. Suppose, as we contemplate extending protection to the last
consumer, or even to the last country, that there does exist a plentiful array of
inventions that could be supported by the rest of the world market excluding this
consumer or country. Then these existing inventions, as just discussed, determine
the deadweight loss due to extending protection, and at the same time, since these
will always be the most profitable of potential inventions, they suggest the unde-
sirability of the inventions that remain. That is, as long as the number of inventions
that can be supported without extending patent protection is at all large, one can
presume that the benefits of extending protection still further, and hence stimulat-
ing a few not-very-desirable inventions, will be outweighed by the costs. Thus I
believe that there is a strong presumption in favour of the optimal geograhic scope
for patent protection being something less than the entire world."
6. WHO SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM PATENT PROTECTION?
While I have argued that some portion of the world should be exempt from a
system of patent protection, in order to maximise the welfare of the world as a
whole, I have not yet discussed what portion of the world this should be. While it
is perhaps not possible to make a formal argument in this regard, there are a
number of reasons why I think it makes sense to exempt developing countries,
starting with the poorest of them.
The most compelling reason for this is an equity argument, based upon the
effect on the world distribution of income. Patent protection has the effect of
transferring income from consumers in the protected market to the monopoly
inventor/producers. Since technological innovation is itself a part of the develop-
ment process and seems to occur more rapidly the more developed a country is,
these monopolists reside predominantly in the richest countries of the world.
Therefore, extending patent protection to poor countries involves a transfer of
welfare from the poor to the rich. Assuming that greater world-wide income
equality is a desirable goal, for any number of reasons, this surely suggest that it
should be the poorest of countries that are exempted.
" In Deardorff (1990)I derive this result formally from a simple model. By assuming that both
demand functions and a function describing the potential inventions are continuous and linear, the
conditions under which global patent protection is suboptimal are made quite weak.
A second reason is that a system of patent protection may be more likely to
induce a substantial flow of inventions in developed countries. Residents of
developed countries have more resources to devote to inventive activities, and
perhaps a greater inclination to do so. Therefore, if we want patent protection to
cover at least those parts of the world where invention takes place, this too suggests
that it be only the developing world that is excluded.'2
Finally, there is a political reason for letting it be only the poorest of countries
that are exempted from patent protection. As the pressures to include intellectual
property issues. in the Uruguay Round make clear, the owners of patents and
potential patents make up a large and powerful constituency in favour of extending
the system. This constituency works most effectively at home, and therefore has
led the developed world to the system of intellectual property protection which we
have today. The poorest countries of the developing world, on the other hand, often
have no such strong constituency, and they may not acquire one as long as they
remain poor. Therefore, to exempt developed countries from patent protection
would be to run counter to their internal domestic political forces, while to exempt
many developing countries most likely would not. Since in this case the political
and economic forces seem to be pushing in the same direction, I sec no reason to
resist them.
A harder question is where to draw the line between the poorest countries that
should be exempt from patent protection and the richest countries that should not.
Should the newly industrialising countries (NICs), for example, be exempt? It is
clear that as countries do succeed in developing, they eventually begin innovating
extensively, and they come to see the benefits for themselves of a system of patent
protection. On the other hand, to wait until they voluntarily adopt such a system is
to wait too long, at least from the standpoint of world efficiency, since patent
protection will always yield some benefit external to their own societies. Thus I can
see the need for the developed countries of the world to lean on the most successful
NICs to get them to adopt intellectual property protection somewhat earlier than
they would voluntarily.
7. CONCLUSION
This discussion has focused on a narrow aspect of the intellectual property rights
debate. I have looked only at patent protection, and my analysis has been based
primarily on a simple static model of how patent rights affect innovation and
market structure. Some will no doubt argue that I have missed the point, in a variety
"1 On the other hand, there really is no need for inventors to reside in an area where there is patent
protection, as long as they are eligible to be granted patents elsewhere. Thus the argument that
developing countries need patent protection in order to encourage their own residents to innovate is
not compelling.
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of ways, and that a different analysis would yield a different result. That may be
true. Perhaps there are, for example, dynamic considerations that could make a
compelling case for extending patent protection even into the poorest and most
remote of countries in the world. If I could be convinced that a patent system would
be the magical key to unlocking the secret of development for those who need it
most, then I would gladly change the conclusion of this paper. But at the moment
I do not see how that case can credibly be made.
Instead, the point I have tried to make here is that resistance to adopting patent
protection in developing countries is not by any means the wrong-headed folly that
advocates of extending protection in the developed countries would like us to
believe. Failure to erect and enforce a patent system is not analogous to, say, the
failure of similar countries to open their markets to trade. More liberal trade
policies will enhance the welfare of developing countries, as they do the welfare of
the world, and the only costs are distributional consequences within the countries
that probably need to be dealt with in any case. But patent protection is almost
certain to redistribute welfare away from developing countries. And it may even
lower world welfare, as I have argued here, if it is extended too far to cover all the
countries of the world. If nothing else, the developing countries that resist this
change should be given a fair hearing.
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TRIPs and the Paradigm of the
GATT: a Tropical, Temperate View
Arvind Subramanian
1. INTRODUCTION
HE term Intellectual Property (IP) and its counterfeit' cousin TRIPs (the
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, including trade in
counterfeit goods) have clearly entered the trade policy lexicon. In the recent past
IP has figured prominently in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral trade policy
processes. 'Successful' negotiations on TRIPs will, by most accounts, weigh
heavily in assessments of the Uruguay Round and of the continued viability of the
multilateral trading system. This paper will analyse TRIPs as an international
economic policy issue in its widely perceived, although not exclusively North-
South context, and examine its role and position in the paradigm of international
trade cooperation embodied in the GATT.
2. THE CONTEXT
The changing pattern of world production and trade and the growing importance
of technology as a determinant of international competitiveness have naturally
focused attention on the means to secure the protection of high technology in the
face of matching developments in imitation-facilitating technologies. Insistent
demands for greater IP protection from its creators, located in the industrialised
world, began to be heard in the trade policy arena as early as the 1970s. TRIPs thus
found its appropriate place on the agenda along with the other so-called new issues
- TRIMs and Services - of the Uruguay Round, which was widely seen as
ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN is currently working as an Economics Affairs Officer in the GATT
Secretariat in Geneva. The views expressed in this paper are his own and should not be attributed to
his employing organisation. He obtained his M.Phil and D.Phil in Economics from the University of
Oxford, England.
' Counterfeit because TRIPs is a misleading term in suggesting the existence of a dichotomy between
trade related and non-trade related IP rights.
setting the multilateral framework for the conditions of international competition
into the next century.
But this seemingly natural coming together of IP and trade against the back-
ground of the emerging importance of technology masks an earlier 'market
failure.' Greater demands for IP protection had always been expressed, but without
eliciting the equilibrating supplies. The arena for these concerns was the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), where years of deliberation produced
international agreements which in some important areas such as patents preserve
the freedom of countries to determine nationally their level of IP protection.2
However, these agreements enjoin that any such protection not discriminate be-
tween nationals and foreigners - the so-called national treatment principle: in
other words, freedom on the level but discipline on the manner, a distinction that is
useful in analysing the economics of IP protection.3
The concerns related largely to the perceived inadequate level of IP protection.
But to the dismay of the 'demandeurs,' attempts to increase the level of protection
within the WIPO context remained unfulfilled. Underlying this perceived failure in
WIPO was a tacit admission that at least within the field of IP there was no
possibility of striking mutually beneficial deals between the major importers and
exporters. Or, in other words, developing countries did not on balance perceive
increased IP protection to be in their interests. The demandeurs appeared to
recognise that such tradeoffs or a Pareto-increasing exchange could only be
successfully made in a trade context. Thus, in multilateral rounds of negotiations
involving many subjects, it is sometimes possible to resolve issues that if addressed
in isolation would simply prove too difficult. The Uruguay Round was seen as
offering the possibility of tradeoffs between topics on the negotiating agenda so
that countries that saw themselves as making concessions4 in one area could seek
countervailing benefits in another. Implicitly the demandeurs in TRIPs hoped to
secure higher IP protection in exchange for concessions in areas such as textiles
and agriculture. 'Positive reciprocity' one might call this.
But there was an equally important obverse side to the reciprocity. I shall call
this 'status quo reciprocity'5 because the status quo is offered as the concession in
return for changes demanded of others. In other words, the denial of existing
market access concessions was the threat for refusal to increase IP protection. This
stick, wielded unilaterally and in bilateral trade relations, was sanctioned, even
mandated by national policy instruments such as Section 301 of the US Trade and
2 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is an exception in that it
prescribes a set of minimum standards for the level of copyright protection.
2 See Subramanian (1990b).
* The word concessions is open to misinterpretation. On the one hand the person receiving the
benefits, be it in the form of reduced tariffs or, in the case of a technology exporter, of higher IP
protection. On the other hand, the person granting may not always 'lose,' depending on whether he
is a mercantilist or a true economic welfarist.
* See Bhagwati (1990).
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Tariff Act - the conspicuously invisible ghost in this tale of doubt, lurking on the
margins of the multilateral arena, but like Hamlet's father's ghost, defining and
determining the outcome.
The portrayal of WIPO as a toothless institution lacking effective international
enforcement mechanisms was one of the reasons advanced for transferring the
issue to GATT. However, this consideration was subsidiary, the main dissatisfac-
tion being less that the existing IP regime in the important area of patents was
inadequately respected around the world than that the WIPO context did not offer
enough leverage to the demandeurs that would assist in changing the regime. This
distinction between negotiating fora and enforcement fora is important in under-
standing the institutional question described below.
IP was also a natural vehicle for advancing the trade policy concerns of the
United States. At the level of substance, the shifting pattern of comparative
advantage pointed to greater specialisation away from the traditional sectors to-
wards knowledge- and R&D-intensive areas. At the level of rhetoric, concerns in
the field of IP could be articulated in the same terms as the perceived grievances in
other areas of trade policy, which contributed to the drift towards unilateralism and
bilateralism in US trade policy. Inadequate IP protection abroad translated into the
Lockean natural rights (an arguably defensible basis for IP protection as Deardorff
rightly argues in his preceding article)6 idiom of the violation of the rights of US
creators by others. 'Theft,' 'robbery,' 'piracy' etc. were thrown about. One more
reason for levelling the playing field.7
This representation of the issue added to the charged and often fractious debate
obscuring, at least in the popular mind, the hard-core economic origins of the
conflict of interests. Obfuscation was contributed in equal measure by developing
countries whose riposte was founded on fuzzy arguments relating to national
sovereignty, freedom to pursue national development and technological goals, and
fears of imperialist domination by large transnational corporations.
3. THE NEGOTIATING ISSUES
Before examining the analytics of IP protection it is worth mentioning the issues
addressed in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
' A problem with natural rights theory, besides those mentioned by Deardorff in the accompanying
article, concerns the notion of individual creation raised by T.S. Elliot in his famous essay, 'Tradition
and the Individual Talent.' If creativity is a cumulative process drawing upon the stock of tradition,
it is questionable whether creative effort can be claimed as an individual's without acknowledging
and rewarding the contribution of the many others.
However, it could not be alleged of unilateralism in the area of IP that it sought or evaluated success
in terms of outcomes rather than rules. It is not clear, however, whether this was due to the nature of
the subject matter or to conscious intent.
(1) Standards or norms of IP protection - This is the most prominent issue and
concerns what the law should specify in terms of the protectable subject
matter, the rights conferred on IP creators, the duration of protection, the
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred notably in the form of compul-
sory licensing, etc. The intellectual property rights addressed are patents,
copyrights, neighbouring rights (which relate to the protection of phonogram
producers, performers and broadcasting organisations), trademarks, industrial
designs, geographical indications including appellations of origin (which re-
late to the protection of names such as 'Bordeaux,' 'Champagne,' etc.), the
layout-design of semi-conductor integrated circuits ('chips') and finally, a
disputed category, trade secrets, which the opponents of inclusion argue is not
an intellectual property right as it does not satisfy one of its defining charac-
teristics, namely that of disclosure.
(2) Enforcement - This concerns judicial, administrative, and criminal proce-
dures available under national law, both internally and at the border (e.g.,
customs procedures), that right holders should have recourse to in order to
enforce their rights in the event of, or in order to prevent, infringement. The
main concern here is to make these procedures effective and expeditious
while ensuring that they do not become barriers to legitimate trade.
(3) Basic principles - These concern inter alia the applicability of the most--
favoured-nation and national treatment principles.
(4) Dispute settlement - This relates to the procedures for settlement of disputes
between governments over their respective international legal obligations
undertaken in the TRIPs context. It should be distinguished from the enforce-
ment issue, which concerns the procedures for the settlement of disputes
between private parties under national law. The dispute settlement question is
related to the large and contentious institutional question of whether the
forum for the multilateral enforcement of obligations should be the GATT or
WIPO. The demandeurs wish to see the TRIPs agreement lodged in the
GATI because of the perceived effectiveness of its dispute settlement proce-
dures. Others wish to see any final agreement lodged outside the GAT'
framework, fearing the possibility of retaliation in the field of goods for
failure to observe obligations in the field of IP. These fears, however, appear
to relate as much to GAT', the negotiating forum, as to GATT, the enforce-
ment forum.
(5) Transitional arrangements - The implementation of any TRIPs agreement
will take time. Differential timeframes for implementation might be agreed
upon, it being likely that special and differential (S&D) treatment in favour of
developing countries will take the form of longer timeframes so that the
actual assumption of obligations by them is delayed.
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4. THE INTERESTS
In the multilateral trade policy arena the battle lines in TRIPs, at least initially,
were drawn along traditional North-South lines. With hindsight it has emerged as
more of a North-South issue than Services in the negotiations. This is not to argue
that there are not important North- North IP issues or that the commercial interests
at stake in this regard are any less significant. Nevertheless, from an analytical
viewpoint, the more interesting issues, notably in the high technology area, are to
be found on the North-South axis.
In the industrialised countries three main, albeit overlapping, interest groups
pushed for greater IP protection:
(1) High technology industries - The large companies that have been the prime
movers of the IP initiative in Europe, the United States, and Japan were
primarily concerned about the protection of technology in its various forms -
patents for inventions in fields such as biotechnology, trade secrets for know-
how, copyright for computer programs, a new form of protection for the layout
design of integrated circuits, etc. The companies that took the lead were the
pharmaceutical/chemical and the information technology companies.
(2) Luxury goods industries -Producers of luxury branded products were mainly
interested in action on trade in counterfeit goods, i.e., goods that involve
infringement of trademarks. The fake Lacoste T-shirt, Gucci handbag, Rolex
or Cartier watch, so much a part of today's consumerist baggage, were exam-
ples of their targets.
(3) Entertainment industries - Companies in the field of sound recordings,
motion pictures and publishing were interested in copyright protection.
One difference between the high technology industries on the one hand and the
luxury and entertainment industries on the other was that the former were espe-
cially keen on improving the standards of protection, while the latter wanted to
improve the mechanisms and procedures for enforcement of rights under national
law. Although this distinction is particularly important in legal and institutional
terms, it is arguably less so in economic terms as standards and enforcement
together determine the level of IP protection.
5. AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: CONFLICT OR CONGRUENCE?
The question at issue is the welfare consequences of higher IP protection by
developing countries. The starting point for the welfare analysis is the un-
ashamedly utilitarian view that IP protection is a form of governmental
intervention aimed at maximising social welfare in the face of market failure
engendered by the public good nature of knowledge or information. IP protection
has two effects: first, the static effect of creating extra-normal profits for the
inventor for the duration of protection and secondly, the dynamic effect of inducing
greater R&D so that over time greater consumer surplus accrues. It ought to be
noted that the ex ante inducement to R&D that ex post protection is meant to
provide is largely an article of faith. Theoretical economics is genuinely divided on
this point. There are models to demonstrate the contrary, namely that competition
rather than temporary monopoly provides the spur to R&D activity.' If this were
true, the general scepticism about TRIPs would be considerably strengthened.
However, here the received wisdom will be taken for granted.
I present below four situations (no doubt there are many more) for which I
analyse heuristically the national and global welfare consequences of higher IP
protection. These will be interesting in themselves and in their implications for
international cooperation.
(i) Imitation + small country--The most important and most plausible situation
of conflict arises when a potential technology importer maintains a low level of
protection to facilitate cheap or costless imitation by indigenous producers. This
can be likened to a positive supply shock. If one postulates in addition a 'small
country' assumption, that is that the level of protection has no significant effect on
global R&D creation, there need be no dynamic losses. Static gains accrue to the
importer whose welfare unambiguously increases; so does global welfare because
of the small country assumption.' Similar results have been obtained by others.10
This configuration, I believe, applies to many areas of current conflict -
pharmaceuticals, software, audio and video cassettes. In the pharmaceutical sector,
for example, indigenous producers in several developing countries compete fer-
ociously, taking advantage of imitation afforded by the lack of patent protection.
Prices are often significantly lower than comparable prices for products patented
abroad." Furthermore, developing countries individually and even collectively
$ See, for example, Kamien and Schwarz (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982).
'This argument might be thought to be vulnerable to fallacy of composition: if all countries
attempted to free ride, there would be significant underproduction of R&D resulting in global welfare
deterioration. Although valid, this is irrelevant in the TRIPS context. Countries with lower levels can
in principle free ride without the threat of reduction in protection by those with the higher level; the
latter can be taken as given and threats of their withdrawal are not credible.
'* See, for example. Chin and Grossman (1990).
" A few observations are perhaps necessary to understand the political economy of IP in some
countries that have strongly opposed demands for increasing protection. This understanding is best
illustrated by a contrast with the political economy of trade protection. The conventional wisdom is
that we see persistent protection because a few producers can organise themselves to lobby for
protection, while the 'many' consumers whose interests are adversely affected, cannot. In the case of
IP protection, where domestic producers operate by imitating foreign technology, there is a
coincidence of the interests of producers and consumers. With low IP, domestic producers
out-compete foreign technology creators while at the same time securing lower prices because of
freer competition. In such cases, the resistance can be considerable, as was borne out by the position
of countries that have well developed indigenous pharmaceutical, software, and entertainment
industries. Here producers' lobbies and consumer interest groups, at least initially, threw their weight
behinga mouse that was seen to further the interests of both.
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account for a small fraction of global sales in products for which R&D is con-
sidered to be important, underscoring the likelihood that patent protection in their
markets will have no significant effect on global R&D. I have dwelt on this
situation at some length not just because of its empirical plausibility or realism but
also because of the questions it raises about the TRIPs initiative.
(ii) Imitation + large country-- Here assume that the imitation possibilities are
as above but that the potential technology importer's IP regime has a significant
effect on R&D. In other words the threat of ex post free riding dents the ex ante
incentive to innovate.12 Clearly global welfare will be higher with higher IP
protection. However, and herein lies the strategic trade theory insight, national
welfare of the technology importing country could still be lower with high IP
protection, because the rent appropriated by the foreign creator of technology
could outweigh any consumer surplus gains resulting from the R&D. A real life
example of this situation could relate to the development of drugs for the treatment
of tropical diseases or of technologies, such as seeds or chemicals, designed for
tropical agriculture. In the absence of IP protection some R&D might not be
undertaken, whereas a decision by a group of developing countries, together
constituting a worthwhile market, to afford greater protection could increase the
incentives for R&D effort in fields of major importance to them. The welfare
calculus would depend inter alia on the magnitude of profits accruing to the foreign
creator of technology and the terms of access to foreign technology.
(iii) Moral hazard- An instance of congruence arises when the cooperation of
the inventor, for example in providing the requisite knowhow, is necessary for the
transfer of technology. Even though the IP regime might have no influence on the
creation of technology, it might on its transfer because of the possibility of the
technology being copied after the transfer is effected. A common situation arises
when employees learn the knowhow necessary for commercialising an invention
and use it in other contexts. In fact, this illustrates the moral hazard problem, so
common in economic analysis. Ex post copying creates adverse ex ante incentives,
and the appropriate solution is one of precommitment, namely for the government
to institute a regime that would disallow such ex post copying and preserve the
appropriate incentives for the transfer of technology. This is an instance of global
and national welfare benefiting from higher IP protection. However, the relevance
of this argument for the current international situation is doubtful because sectors
where higher protection is being sought are precisely those where imitation is
possible even without the cooperation of the inventor so that the transfer of
technology.does not have to rely on the provision of incentives to facilitate such
transfer.
" A similar situation is examined in Diwan and Rodrik (1989).
(iv) Discrimination - Conflicts might also arise because countries wish to
discriminate in favour of nationals in relation to R&D.13 One kind of situation
envisaged is where a foreign and domestic firm have filed a patent application for
an identical or similar product or process, and the government chooses to grant the
patent to the domestic firm irrespective of who filed first. This conflict arises once
again because the monopoly profits created by IP protection, when accruing to
foreign nationals, do not contribute to domestic welfare, creating a case for
discrimination. Such situations arise whenever there exists some indigenous R&D
capability even if it is inferior to that prevailing abroad. In other words, there could
be an infant industry argument for some developing countries to promote the
activity of R&D generation.14 This result is however subject to all the usual caveats
applying to the interventionist conclusions of strategic trade theory - the neglect
of general equilibrium considerations, the onerous informational requirements,
doubts about the practical design of such a policy, etc. The essential point here is
that in principle national welfare could increase. Global welfare would however,
unambiguously decrease.
6. CERTAIN MYTHS
(i) IP protection and R&D - Many commentators and countless industry
experts writing about TRIPs have taken as self evident that IP protection is
essential for R&D generation. Is that not why society has instituted a system for the
protection of property rights? The simple answer to that is: (1) IP is important for
R&D generation in some sectors in countries with R&D capability; (2) IP may not
be important for R&D generation for technology importers for whom imitation
serves as a substitute (albeit imperfect); and (3) the lack of IP protection by some
might not adversely affect global R&D if the countries in question are 'small'
enough. With the small country assumption, TRIPs is more accurately seen as an
exercise in rent creation and rent shifting rather than as an attempt to enhance
global R&D.
(ii) Respect for rights or national advantage - One view, inspired by natural
rights theory, has tried to represent the North-South dimension on IP as reflecting
different approaches to respecting property rights in general. This characterisation
glosses over the use of low IP protection to national economic advantage by
developed and developing countries alike, unmindful of underlying rights con-
siderations. Developing countries exempt a few more sectors from IP protection in
the area of technology than developed countries do. However, all these sectors
" Despite the discipline of national treatment that virtually all international agreements require of
signatories, there are many instances of de facto discrimination found in patent and trademark law
and in patent enforcement procedures in developed and developing countries alike.
" See, for example, Subramanian (1990a).
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have, until recently, been similarly excluded by many European countries and will
continue to be excluded by some of the others until the mid-1990s. By posing the
conflict as one related to rights, this view also misrepresents the relatively narrow
range of areas on which differences exist. In fact it is canny that all those areas
where developing countries have relatively lower levels of IP protection are
precisely those where there is a real conflict of economic interests, a conflict
stemming from a single characteristic applicable to all such areas: copyability. This
is as true of the high technology areas -pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and software
- as of the entertainment and high fashion areas. Unsurprisingly the technology
areas, where developing countries have low IP protection and thus benefit from
imitation, are also those areas where research shows protection to be important in
allowing the appropriation of returns fromR&D.' 5 In other areas there is no
conflict: levels of protection are similar because means other than IP protection
(such as increasing returns to scale, advertising, secrecy, etc.) are more effective in
ensuring the appropriation of returns from R&D.
There is an important ethical/legal distinction between counterfeiting and piracy
on the one hand and IP protection in the technology areas on the other, but in terms
of the economics there is very little difference. Counterfeiting and piracy are
potentially more likely areas of conflict as they better fulfill the copyability
criterion -it is far easier to produce and stitch a crocodile label onto a T-shirt than
indeed to reverse engineer a medical compound.
(iii) Transfer of technology - There are fervent expositions in favour of
developing countries granting higher IP protection on grounds that this would
facilitate the transfer of technology to developing countries, increase foreign
investment, boost growth, etc.16 In the light of what has been argued earlier, it
should be clear that the transfer of technology consideration is largely irrelevant.
To repeat, the areas of conflict are the highly copyable ones; copyability can almost
tautologically be defined as the lack of need for technology transfer. The cooper-
ation of the creator is unnecessary in developing the product as indigenous
producers can imitate it cheaply. In other areas where technology transfer requires
the cooperation of the inventor and therefore high IP protection, this is already
provided for. In sum, where this argument is valid there is no conflict, and where
there is conflict it is invalid.
(iv) Higher IP protection and liberal economic policy - There has been an
apparent correlation in recent years between the shedding of dirigiste economic
policy and the adoption of higher IP protection. It is therefore tempting to conclude
causation at the peril of ignoring that first lesson in undergraduate statistics that
correlation does not imply causation. The missing variable in this statistical model
is bilateral pressure notably by the United States under Section 301. By and large,
" See Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987).
" See, for example, Siebeck (1990).
changes in developing country IP regimes have been made pursuant to discussions
under Section 301. A more telling piece of evidence pointing to the overwhelming
explanatory power of this variable is that prior to its deployment the correlation
also operated in the opposite direction: generally low levels of IP protection were
also found in conjunction with relatively liberal trade and industrial policies. Chile
and the Far Eastern dragons are cases in point.
7. REQUIREMENTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE PARADIGM, THE GATT AND
TRIPS
a. Aggregate Welfare
It must be a sine que non of any international arrangement for cooperation in the
field of trade that the policies or objectives being pursued serve to enhance global
welfare, however imperfectly the term may lend itself to definition or quantifica-
tion. The traditional GATTparadigm eminently satisfies this requirement, because
in seeking national liberalisation it pursues an objective that is not only nationally,
but also globally, welfare enhancing. This raises the question of why GATT is
necessary at all. The answer, of course, is that the GATT is necessary for the
politics, if not the economics of trade liberalisation. First, it has to contend with the
mercantilist view of imports as 'bad' and exports as 'good.' In this scenario GATT
offers countries the opportunity to precommit themselves to an apparently exter-
nally imposed discipline in the conduct of trade policy. Such precommitment
enables the mediation of conflicts between competing groups within a country. 7
Furthermore, GATT facilitates national liberalisation by requiring multilateral or
reciprocal liberalisation that helps to create constituencies (e.g., in export sectors)
with a stake in liberalisation. Finally, by allowing limited exceptions to the rules of
trade liberalisation, the GATT acknowledges the need for facilitating adjustment
to the changes brought about by liberalisation.
However, does TRIPs satisfy the condition of contributing to global welfare?
The answer is probably no. In situation (i) described above - the empirically
plausible situation - there is genuine ground for believing that global welfare
deteriorates with higher IP protection. Several studies cited below confirm this
finding. This result in my view sets TRIPs apart from several of the trade policy
issues in the Uruguay Round and in the traditional GATT areas.18
" Robert Hudec has drawn my attention to one of the less recognised rules served by TRIPS in
industrialised countries, namely its use by lobbies to advocate and pursue higher international IP
standards in order to secure or even legitimise higher IP protection at home. Recent trends in
copyright legislation in the United States and patent legislation in Europe are cases in point.
"The question of whether higher IP protection is pro- or anti-trade is in my view peripheral in
assessing its appropriateness as a GATT subject. The preamble to the GATT is a salutary reminder
that GATT's objective is greater welfare, (with trade liberalisation merely serving as the means to
attain this objective) and IP should therefore be assessed in welfare terms.
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However, it could legitimately be alleged of this view that it is too narrowly
focused and ignores the wider canvas. Higher IP protection might lead to greater
aggregate welfare for two reasons. First, insofar as low IP protection results in
counterfeiting and piracy that amount to unfair trade judged on universal rather
than unilateral standards, it is in the systemic interest to pursue higher IP protec-
tion. Second, higher IP protection might be necessary, even crucial, in achieving
libcralisation in other areas or in helping to keep the large trading powers com-
mitted to the multilateral trading system, resulting in the larger good. Taking these
as working hypotheses, it is clear that greater global welfare results, but at the
expense of welfare losses to some - in this case, the countries granting higher IP
protection. This leads to the second requirement that an international paradigm for
cooperation must satisfy.
b. The Distribution of Welfare
The case for international cooperation might in principle be greater where
situations of conflict of economic interest arise between countries. However, in
some cases international cooperation must address the distribution question, not
merely because equity is objectively desirable but for its essential role in maintain-
ing systemic feasibility and stability. The attainment of these objectives is
facilitated if global welfare increases are translated into Paretian welfare
increases.19
It can be seen that in situations (ii) and (iv) the welfare of the technology
importing countries deteriorates but global welfare increases. I suspect that this
configuration has general applicability to the range of situations identified by and
addressed in strategic trade theory. That is to say, interventionist trade or industrial
policy (in our examples either through discrimination or IP protection) enhances
national welfare at the expense of global welfare through profit or rent shifting in
favour of nationals. At the global level of course it does not matter who reaps the
profits. Thus, if international cooperation such as in TRIPs pursues higher IP
protection (where situation (ii) prevails), or non-discrimination (where situation
(iv) prevails), global welfare will increase.
It is worth noting that this configuration of global welfare gains but national
losses are alien to the traditional GATT paradigm where national policy actions
(e.g., tariff or quota reductions) simultaneously increase national and global wel-
fare. However, I would argue that in principle the GATT paradigm is suited to cope
with the distributional aspects because it provides for implicit compensation mech-
anisms. GATE rounds of multilateral trade negotiations are indeed compensation
mechanisms that allow gainers to compensate losers within particular areas and
" The drift towards unilateralism in the United States appears to have stemmed in large part from
perceived asymmetries in the multilateral trading system.
across areas.2 GATT negotiating rounds provide for reciprocity, a mechanism
which becomes more important if there are welfare losses for individual countries
as is the case in TRIPs. It is perhaps worth recalling that this was an important
reason underlying the introduction of TRIPs into the Uruguay Round. However,
between the possibility of reciprocity (positive reciprocity that is) and its realisa-
tion lies the shadow, or perhaps one should say the ghost, of bilateralism.
At this writing, it is too early to predict the outcome of the Uruguay Round and
hence to assess whether the distribution question will be satisfactorily resolved
through significant compensatory offers to developing countries, for example, in
the areas of agriculture and textiles. But to some extent these questions appear to
have faded in importance. Section 301 of the US trade law has pre-empted and
indeed defined the outcome in TRIPs to a considerable extent. At least some of the
importantchanges that were set as objectives on the North-South axis in the Uruguay
Round have largely been attained through bilateral initiatives. The ghost has a better
record for spurring successful action than his literary counterpart. Copyright,
trademark and/or patent legislation have been or will soon be significantly changed
in South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico, Argentina,
Chile, and Brazil. Whatever the compensation that may have been accorded to these
countries in this relatively opaque process, 'status quo' reciprocity appears to have
played an important role, so that the abstention from withdrawal of existing market
access concessions appears to have been presented as 'compensation.' Thus TRIPs
will arguablynolonger be the objectof bargaining and compensatory offers between
North and South, or at least not to the same extent, on the multilateral arena as it
was expected to be or otherwise ought to have been,
There is a cautionary tale. TRIPs has exposed an inherent limitation in the
workings of multilateralism. There is a systemic weakness which is that multilat-
eralism cannot prevent multilateral outcomes from being largely the product of
asymmetric bilateral processes. In other words multilateral outcomes need not
always be determined by multilateral bargaining, which is thought to protect the
small against the strong, but might serve to legitimise the objectives of bilateralism.
If the gloomy prognosis about the world economy were to be proved true, with
protectionist sentiment remaining in favour, it is difficult to believe that bilateral-
ism, with its proven success in the area of IP, will be easily renounced. In the
traditional trade policy areas one could argue that there was less to fear of
bilateralism at least insofar as its objectives were nationally and globally desir-
able.? One could perhaps even advocate a role for, or at least be less critical of,
unilateralism on grounds of 'justifiable non-compliance,' in Professor Hudec's
words.2
2* In fact, the GAT negotiating rounds also allow for periodic adjustment to shifting comparative
advantage.
21 Ignoring for a moment the other perils of unilateralism documented in Bhagwati (1988).
" See Hudec (1990).
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8. CONCLUSION
In the area of TRIPs, ends and means merit a critical examination. 'Ends'
because the economics posits a presumption of global welfare deterioration.
'Means' because insofar as positive compensation needs to be forthcoming to
make up for national welfare losses even where there are global welfare gains,
bilateralism with its 'status quo' reciprocity, tends to impede the working of a
multilateralism that could provide for such compensation.
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2 RACHAEL McCULLOCH
Investment Policies in the GATT
Rachel McCulloch
1. INTRODUCTION
EARLY all countries make efforts to attract inward direct investment. At the
same time, most also impose limits on access and otherwise restrict the
activities of foreign-controlled companies within their borders. This carrot-and-
stick approach can have important consequences for the location of economic
activity and for the efficiency of that activity in any given location. In particular,
investment policies can have predictable effects on trade flows similar to those of
policies aimed explicitly at trade: reducing imports, expanding exports, or both.
Along with other nontariff measures that influence trade flows, investment
policies have become more conspicuous in recent decades. As successive rounds
of GATT negotiations have achieved major reductions in the role played by the
more straightforward trade-influencing policies, a major but unanticipated result
has been expanded use of investment measures and other 'opaque' forms of
protection as alternative means to achieve national objectives. Because of this
substitution, the central trade-liberalisation goal of the GAT may not be attain-
able without limits on at least some types of national policies toward direct
investment.
The Uruguay Round was the first GATT round to attempt negotiations on
policies toward foreign direct investment. While some past agenda items (e.g.,
subsidies) have been comparable in their importance to members' perceived ability
to control economic activity within their borders, none has been such a core issue
in terms of national sovereignty. In the case of direct investment, the policies in
question are aimed specifically at controlling the extent and character of foreign
production within the nation's own boundaries. Moreover, by its very nature, direct
investment tends to be concentrated in sectors of the economy that conform least
well to the paradigm of perfect competition. Thus, standard arguments for free
trade are least likely to apply without significant qualification.
This paper examines the economic and political context of the Uruguay Round
negotiations on investment measures. Within the GATT, investment measures
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have been treated as a particular instance of a broader problem: the proliferation of
nontariff trade distortions. However, this approach ignores the interaction between
multinational firms and governments that is typical when host countries seek to
regulate direct investment. Observed investment measures are often the end result
of a bargaining process. A central issue is whether investment regimes actually
alter the allocation of resources in production and trade or merely the distribution
of rents between firms and host countries. The analysis in this paper underscores
that trade impact depends as much on economic conditions as on the specific
combination of investment measures imposed.
2. GAIT INITIATIVES.ON INVESTMENT
Given its nature and purpose, the GAiT is far from being the obvious forum for
discussion of issues related to foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed, inclusion of
investment policies on the agenda for the Uruguay Round negotiations was itself a
major break with past practice and strongly opposed by some capital-importing
nations. In the Uruguay Round, consideration has been limited to a subset of
investment policies known as 'trade related investment measures' (TRIMs). These
include local content requirements, minimum export requirements, and similar
regulations tied specifically to the trade practices of multinational firms, along with
other policies that may have a less explicit but nonetheless significant influence on
trade flows through their effects on the location of production.
The success of the GAT as a vehicle for promoting open markets for interna-
tionally traded goods has rested from the start on a delicate balance between two
conflicting goals of member nations: securing the acknowledged collective bene-
fits of freer trade and integrated global markets (more precisely and from the
mercantilistic perspective of most negotiators, securing improved access to old and
new export markets) while sacrificing a minimum of national sovereignty. Until
the Tokyo Round, the balance between these goals was achieved by concentrating
liberalisation efforts on national policy measures that affect goods 'at the border',
primarily tariffs. Yet the acclaimed success of these efforts in slashing most tariffs
brought about notably less success in achieving the ultimate goal of freer trade.
Rather, the role of 'nontariff' trade distortions became increasingly prominent.
Some nontariff policies had already been in place but now loomed larger as tariff
barriers shrank. To a considerable extent, however, the very success of the GATE
in limiting the use of tariffs led member nations to substitute other measures from
the shortened menu of allowed policy instruments. In turn, countermeasures in-
itially aimed at these nontariff barriers themselves blossomed into further
distortions of trade flows, as in the case of countervailing and anti-dumping duties.
The Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round were thus required to tackle a wide range
of nontariff policies and practices. Even when not their primary intent, these
measures can have a significant distorting impact on trade flows.1
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Within the GATT framework, there are two possible approaches to dealing with
investment-related issues. The first, already implemented in a number of cases, is
to apply existing GATT articles to situations arising from national or subnational
investment policies. This approach focuses on the possible trade-distorting effects
of the policies rather than the policies themselves. For example, the United States
was successful in arguing before a GATT panel that local content requirements
imposed by Canada's Foreign Investment Review Agency violated Article XXIII.
However, the panel did not agree with the US contention that Canadian export
performance requirements for foreign investors violated GAIT rules.
The second approach, as pursued in the Uruguay Round by the United States, is
to negotiate new agreements that broaden GATT authority to deal with specific
policies not previously covered by GAT rules. In practice, this strategy concen-
trates on enumerating proscribed, suspect, and acceptable policies toward direct
investments. But, because a method that singles out unacceptable policies has the
proven disadvantage of promoting the substitution of less transparent alternatives,
it may be more the form than the fact of protection which is thereby controlled.
The Uruguay Round negotiations on investment were initiated at the insistence
of US-based multinational firms and labour groups, at a time when policy concerns
within the United States were still focused mainly on outward investments by US
firms. Complaints highlighted the presumed effects on US production and profits
of performance requirements imposed by a number of less developed host coun-
tries and by Canada under the Foreign Investment Review Act.
Ironically, US efforts within the GAIT started to bear fruit just when direct
investment by European, Canadian, and Japanese firms in the United States had
begun a period of rapid growth, and US policy concerns had become more aligned
with those of other host countries. By the mid-1980s, the United States had
emerged as the world's largest host country in terms of the total value of inward
direct investment. Yet the United States continued to be the main advocate of
GAIT restrictions on TRIMs, even while the Congress contemplated new policies
to monitor and regulate the activities of Foreign companies within US borders.
3. A GATT FOR INVESTMENT
Proceeding within the GATT framework implies at a best a partial remedy for
the efficiency losses that may arise from national policies toward direct invest-
ment. In particular, any GATT action must be justified in terms of significant
effects on trade. Rather than trying to shoe-horn investment issues into the GATT
framework at all (over the vehement objections of some less developed host
countries), why not treat the problem separately in a logical and comprehensive
fashion?
For many years there have been calls for a new international forum that would
oversee foreign direct investment in much the way that GATT oversees interna-
tional trade - in effect, a GAT' for foreign investment, as originally proposed by
Goldberg and Kindleberger(1970) and endorsed by many other academic special-
ists. Such a body would establish a set of rules and dispute-settlement procedures
aimed at increasing the global benefits of international investment, just as GATT
does - at least in principle - for national policies governing trade.
The evident reluctance of the United States and other major industrial nations to
pursue free standing multilateral negotiations on investment issues may be rooted
in the failure of previous efforts along similar lines. The International Trade
Organization (ITO) was designed at the end of World War II to complete the
institutional framework for international cooperation that included also the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank). At the urging of the US business community, the ITO
draft charter dealt specifically with national policies toward foreign direct invest-
ment. But to the eyes of US companies concerned primarily about the security of
their property abroad, the actual provisions of the charter appeared to favour the
interests of host over source countries. The objections of the US business com-
munity were one reason for the eventual failure of the United States to ratify the
charter (Spero, 1981). The GATT, as a more limited successor to the ITO, made no
attempt to deal with foreign investment issues.
The World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID), established in 1965, remains the only international forum devoted
entirely to the settlement of foreign investment issues, but one that is remarkably
toothless even relative to other international bodies. Disputes must be submitted
voluntarily by both parties, precluding consideration of the most controversial
issues. Moreover, the ICSID has no power to enforce its decisions (Lipson, 1985).
Yet some Latin American nations have seen even this mildest form of governance
as intruding unacceptably on national sovereignty.
In the early postwar period, as many former colonies became sovereign nations,
the prospect for setting up an international regulatory body that could satisfy both
host and source countries grew ever more remote. By the 1970s, the atmosphere in
the major international organisations had become openly confrontational. De-
mands for a 'New International Economic Order' were pressed by less developed
nations of a somewhat unified 'South' upon an unprepared 'North' reeling from
oil-price shocks. High on the South's agenda were measures to enhance host-
country control over multinational corporations.
While the industrial nations were understandably slow to acquiesce to such
demands, the increased policy activism of host countries also increased the press-
ure to provide some form of international governance in this area. The nations of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced
a voluntary code of conduct for multinational firms, intended primarily to disavow
the most controversial and anticompetitive business practices attributed to multi-
national corporations. Voluntary codes were also produced by the Center on
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Transnational Corporations of the United Nations and by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
By the 1980s, both the investment climate and the prospects for new types of
international agreements had begun to improve. The inclusion of investment issues on
the Uruguay Round agenda was one reflection of this improvement. After a decade or
more of experimentation with aggressive regulation of multinational firms, host
countries were concemed as much about competing to attract foreign firms as about
controlling their activities. The formerly appealing strategies of expropriation and of
'unbundling' direct investment - i.e., acquiring foreign technology and financial
capital without foreign equity participation - had been somewhat discredited by the
generally disappointing results actually achieved by nations implementing them.
While policy activism toward direct investment had not been renounced entirely, the
carrot-and-stick approach had largely replaced the stick.
A second change that also augured well for progress on international agreements
was the increased extent of intra-industry foreign direct investment among the
industrialised nations, and especially involving the United States. This develop-
ment blurred the distinction, at least among industrial nations, between host and
source countries. In the 1960s, the United States was the preeminent and indeed
quintessential source country, by far the most conspicuous potential beneficiary of
limits on nationalistic policies of host countries. By 1990, the United States
remained a major source country and the strongest voice for international action to
regulate investment policies, yet it had also become the world's most important
host to direct investment. The European Community as well as Canada and Japan
had gained a corresponding stake in placing limits on host-country investment
policies, and particularly those of the United States. The US-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, ratified in 1988, in fact went far beyond any multilateral action
contemplated in the Uruguay Round. Like other aspects of the agreement, this may
be viewed as a 'leading indicator' of trends in multilateral negotiations.
Given these developments, the 1990s may offer the first real opportunity in
many decades for comprehensive multilateral negotiations on investment issues.
Indeed, while the concept of a GAIT for investment remained alive mainly in the
academic literature during the 1970s and 1980s, by 1990 it had reemerged as a
serious proposal for action. For this reason, I deal with national investment policies
somewhat more broadly in this paper than was actually undertaken in the Uruguay
Round negotiations, while still concentrating on the potential effects of such
policies on location of production and trade flows.
4. NATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES
Although the universe of policies potentially affecting foreign direct invest-
ments is immense, policies relevant to recent international negotiations can be
classified into two basic types: incentives for investment and operating restrictions
on investment (performance requirements). As extremes, the first type includes the
requirement of local establishment for market access, a policy prominent in ser-
vices, while the second type includes investment prohibitions in specific sectors as
well as limits on the percentage of foreign equity ownership.
The Uruguay Round negotiations focused mainly on certain performance re-
quirements - the policies now known as TRIMs - that are presumed to have
direct effects on trade flows. However, not all TRIMs are binding; non-binding
TRIMs may have no effect on trade flows. Moreover, almost all TRIMs are
imposed in conjunction with investment incentives. To the extent that incentives
are successful in influencing the location of production, they may equally, if not as
transparently, be regarded as trade-related measures.
Despite a perception on the part of some US officials and some US-based
companies that TRIMs 'constitute one of the most serious trade policy problems
facing the international trading community' (LICIT, 1981), neither the documented
incidence of measures nor available estimates of their trade-distorting effects
provide strong support for this position. Although a laissez-faire approach toward
foreign investment is clearly the exception ratherthan the rule among host countries,
data from several empirical studies of policy measures with specific trade effects
yield surprisingly little consensus on their relative frequency and importance.
A US Department of Commerce study of 24,666 foreign affiliates of US
companies found that in 1977 just over a quarter of these benefited from some type
of incentives to investment, while on average 14 per cent were subject to one or
more performance requirement. However, only two per cent of US affiliates were
subject to a minimum export requirement, three per cent to a maximum import
level, three per cent to a minimum level of local inputs, and eight per cent to a
minimum labour local requirement, with about six per cent overall affected by one
or more of these measures (US Department of Commerce, 1981). In sharp contrast,
a much smaller but more detailed World Bank study of 74 investments found that
more than half were subject to explicit trade-related performance requirements:
however, many of these were considered non-binding by the respondents (Guis-
inger, 1986, p. 92).
One important finding of the Commerce study in light of subsequent develop-
ments in the Uruguay Round was that a much larger percentage of US subsidiaries
in less developed countries were subject to performance requirements than in
developed countries. Both the Commerce and World Bank studies confirmed that
TRIMs were much more prevalent than average in some manufacturing industries,
notably automobiles. These conclusions support the view that less developed
countries rely on investment measures as an integral part of overall industrial
development policies.
A study of 682 investments commissioned by the US Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC) found 40 per cent of all OPIC-supported projects subject
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to actual or potential trade-related investment performance requirements. How-
cvcr, because of OPIC policies regarding eligibility, these investments cannot be
regarded as a random sample of all US investments either by host country or by
industry. In particular, no automobile investments were included.
The studies revealed considerable variation across host countries in preferred
policy strategies. Approaches favoured by individual host countries ranged from
Mexico's explicit published performance requirements, through France's tax
breaks tied to job creation and exports, to Ireland's cash grants to subsidiaries
producing for export (Moran and Pearson, 1988, pp. 122-122). In the United States
no fewer than 24 state governments were found to offer investment incentives,
prompting the observation that although the United States has no local-content
legislation, 'it would be disingenuous to suggest that the pursuit by certain states
of foreign-owned automobile plants has no impact on the country's trade flows' (p.
122).
While diverging markedly on the relative importance of TRIMs, all studies have
noted the large number of early equivalent policy instruments used by any one
host. For example, the World Bank study found that in a group of ten developed
and less developed host countries, governments used an average of 22 different
investment policies of various types. Although no government used all available
measures in the case of each investment, the average number of instruments per
project was 'surprisingly high' (Guisinger, 1986, p. 84).
Since an equivalent net incentive could be provided much more simply, some
investigators concluded that the nontransparency achieved through multiple and
apparently contradictory policy instruments might in fact serve the interests of the
host government and perhaps even the foreign firm. The availability of multiple
incentives and disincentives could enhance the ability of the host to act as a
discriminating monopolist, i.e., to extract a larger share of the profits associated
with a particular project. On the other hand, an investing firm would be better able
to conceal from potential competitors -and perhaps also from a suspicious public
- the extent of preferential treatment bestowed on its activity.
Even harder to pin down than the extent of TRIMs is the actual effect on
subsidiaries subject to these policies. In two-thirds of the projects surveyed in the
World Bank study, managers reported that the location decision was affected by
incentive policies. However, the question posed was whether the same location
would have been chosen in the absence of host incentives but the same perfor-
mance requirements, and with all investment policies of alternative sites
unchanged. Since performance requirements are almost always paired with incen-
tives, and since there is often active competition among localities for new
investments, the two-thirds figure is clearly an extreme upper bound on the fraction
of investments thus influenced.
Survey evidence suggests a rather minor effect of the performance requirements
themselves on exports and imports. Many TRIMs were perceived to be non-bind-
ing, while others merely speeded up changes in trade that firms would have
undertaken even in the absence of the policies. As already noted, such reports may
reflect ex-ante versus ex-post optimisation by corporations. However, as Safarian
(1983, p. 612) has observed, reporting may be incomplete because companies are
reluctant to appear critical of 'the wielders of regulatory and fiscal power' in host
countries.
5. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE GLOBALLY INTEGRATED FIRM
National investment policies, whether of host or source countries, seek to
enhance benefits derived from the presence of multinational corporations (MNCs).
This may entail rent shifting, changes in the pattern of production and trade, or
some combination of these. While rent shifting affects primarily the distribution of
benefits within and between countries from an investment, changes in the pattern
of production or trade may improve overall economic efficiency by correcting a
market failure or achieve certain 'non-economic' objectives of policy makers. To
analyse the potential consequences of investment policies, it is useful to begin by
considering the role of direct investments in global production and trade, first in a
fully integrated global economy without national boundaries and then in a world
divided into sovereign nations.
In a world without national boundaries or other barriers to the free movement of
goods and productive factors, maximisation of profits requires minimisation of
cost. The location of each step in any production process is therefore determined
by cost alone, so as to minimise the overall cost of serving any particular market.
Depending on scale economies and the relative costs of moving goods versus
required inputs, a given process may be carried out at a single location or at many
locations around the world.
In a fully integrated global economy, observed trade among regions may be
based on classical comparative advantage, scale economies, or a combination of
the two. Some firms operate at a single location and carry out only a single process;
any required coordination of the activities of individual firms is then achieved
entirely through arm's-length (market) transactions. For other firms, coordination
of activities in multiple locations is performed by a single management -'inter-
nalised' by the firm, in the language of industrial organisation. However, since
internalisation has costs of its own, the existence of multiple-location or multiple-
product firms has to be explained in terms of corresponding increases in efficiency
over what could be attained with separate management and market coordination.
Now contrast production and trade under the more realistic assumption that the
world economy is divided into multiple political jurisdictions. A central feature of
this case is that profit maximisation no longer implies cost minimisation. Along
with whatever factors determine the cost of serving any given market in a fully
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integrated economy, location of production in a multi-country world must also
reflect any policy induced elements of profitability, including tariffs and other
trade policies, taxes and susidies, and policies toward foreign investment. These
policies can affect profits through either costs.or revenues. In particular, higher
profits may be associated with both higher revenues and high production costs, as
might occur with induced local production to serve a protected market.
Where does direct investment fit into this scheme? Whenever multiple-location
firms span national boundaries, the pattern of profit-maximising production by
definition includes foreign direct investment. However, since firms operating in
foreign locations typically incur costs higher than otherwise similarlocal firms, the
existence of such operations again has to be explained in terms of greater firm
profitability.
Modem theories of foreign direct investment rest on the existence of a firm-spe-
cific advantage that is most profitably exploited through managerial control over
operations in multiple countries. This firm-specific advantage may also provide the
basis for the existence of multiple-location operations within a single integrated
economy. However, because production costs are necessarily minimised in the
case of a single integrated economy but not in a multi-country world, it is useful to
separate direct investments into three categories.
The first category of investment, which I call cost-driven, consists of those parts
of multiple-location operations simply relabelled as foreign direct investments
when national boundaries are superimposed on what was previously assumed to be
a single integrated economy. Obviously, the newly designated 'foreign investors'
in this category are a subset of all firms that would engage in multiple-plant
operations in the single-economy case. These investments are characterised by
strong locational motives along with significant internalisation benefits. Extractive
industries provide numerous examples of cost-driven investments. Other important
categories are consumer services, e.g., retail banking and hotels, and investments
complementary to local sales, such as distribution and service facilities.
Although this category includes all investments not subject to any specific
investment policies, an investment would also be appropriately included even
when it is subject to investment policies as long as actual production and trade
decisions are not affected by the policies. This may be true because the policies are
aimed primarily at extracting rents rather than changing production decisions,
because policies are not expected to be binding, because policies overall play only
a minor role in the firm's decisions relative to other locational advantages or
political stability, or because any incentive package offered by one potential host
is largely matched by others. The latter two possibilities may apply in the case of
'footloose' activities that are the object of active bidding by rival would-be hosts.
The second and third categories consist of those direct investments actually
induced by the assumed division of the world into sovereign political jurisdictions,
rather than merely relabelled. In the second category, which I call policy-driven,
are investments directly influenced by national policies, including those located and
operated to serve a protected market, to benefit from favourable tax treatment or
other incentives, or to meet local-content requirements applied to existing oper-
ations. From the point of view of the firm, such investments represent a second-best
response to market fragmentation. Most entail substitution between local production
and foreign production, with higher production cost to the firm, and corresponding
changes in trade. Many manufacturing investments in both developed and less
developed countries, such as those in electronics and automobiles, belong in this
category. Such investments may be either import-substituting or export-oriented.
Investments in the third category, which I call border-driven, are not direct
responses to specific policies; rather, they are responses to the fact of multiple
political jurisdictions. Such investments have no easily predictable impact on local
production, trade, or global efficiency. Establishment of local production may be a
means to enhance the firm's credibility as a market participant, whether in the eyes
of consumers or of potential competitors. Also, since production and market
conditions in sovereign political units are likely to be less than perfectly correlated,
an increase in the extent of direct investment may be part of the firm's risk-man-
agement strategy for a multi-country world. Border-driven investments are
designed to capture the benefits of being multinational, rather than the advantages
of locating the finn's activities in any specific place.
Although it would be impractical to apply this classification to actual invest-
ments, the distinctions among the three types provide some insight into the issues
arising both from national investment policies and from attempts to limit their use.
The first two categories of cost-driven and policy-driven investments correspond
roughly to two potential objectives of national policy measures: rent extraction
(with no intended effect on resource allocation) and resource reallocation.
In cost-driven investments, firm location decisions are unchanged from the case
of the integrated world economy. However, the imposition of national boundaries
implies potential competition with other tax jurisdictions, as well as with foreign
owners and workers, for whatever rents are associated with the firm-specific
advantage. Taxes, together with rules on transfer pricing and remittances, are the
main policy tools used to extract such rents on behalf of the host (or source)
government. Taxation may have little or no direct effect on production and trade.
However, rent may also be extracted implicitly via (binding) performance require-
ments that reduce firm profits.
For policy-driven investments, rent extraction remains a potential goal of policy
makers, but this is achieved in conjunction with changes in global production that
are themselves policy induced. Since most changes in production move the firm
away from its preferred (profit-maximising) position, only marginal results are
likely to be achieved without the inclusion of policy measures to enhance firm
rents, For example, a tariff may be used to protect the domestic market from
imports of a good that would otherwise be supplied from abroad. If the supplying
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finn possesses a firm-specific advantage sufficiently valuable to offset the greater
cost of producing locally, it will now shift the location of some production activity
to the host country.
Although somewhat artificial, this classification is helpful in understanding the
conflict within the GAIT over the appropriate treatment of investment policies. To
the extent that investments are cost-driven and policies mainly shift rents without
affecting the allocation of resources, there is little resulting impact on trade (or on
overall economic efficiency). However, whether this is true in any particular
situation depends on both the policies and the underlying economic forces.
Some less developed countries have therefore argued that the GATT should
focus not on the measures themselves, but only on their effects on trade flows, and
then only when the resulting impact on trade - if there is such an impact - is
significant and the resulting injury to other countries sufficiently great to merit a
sacrifice of national sovereignty by the host. In contrast, the United States has
favoured an approach that begins by identifying particular measures that may be
expected to affect trade -- akind of 'round up the usual suspects' approach. But in
either case, if significant trade effects are the criterion for including investment
measures in international negotiations, a large set of policies, including most taxes
and many types of incentives, is thus omitted entirely from consideration.
6. THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION
As with policies toward trade, in practice national policies aimed at investment
tend to reduce global efficiency via suboptimal allocation of resources in produc-
tion and via associated rent seeking activities. An important difference, however,
is that investment policies are less likely than those aimed directly at trade flows to
reduce the country's own aggregate welfare. International cooperation may there-
fore be even more important than in the case of trade in avoiding a 'prisoner's
dilemma' situation.
For a country small enough to have no appreciable effect on world prices, the
cost of tariff protection is borne almost entirely by the country itself. Even for large
countries, the net effect of protection on national welfare is typically negative. But
when a tariff creates an incentive for import-substituting direct investment, and
investment policies are then used to extract some part of the rents generated by
foreign-controlled production for the local market, the country may in fact gain.
However, the foreign investor will also gain (or expect to gain), at least relative to
the situation of protection but no investment. The corresponding losses, although
typically larger in the aggregate, will be spread among other competing suppliers
but may be small for any one of them. An important implication is that the
'problem' of TRIMs is at least in part a problem of incomplete liberalisation of
trade. Without tariffs, quotas, and other import barriers, there would be less rent to
extract and thus less scope for performance requirements.
Efforts to bring investment policies under GATT discipline have come princi-
pally from the United States and have been propelled by the perceived interests of
some US-based multinational finns. Yet while there is no question that many
US-based firms have been affected by TRIMs, the evidence is far from conclusive
that source countries like the United States have been harmed significantly by the
use of these policies. In many instances, the host country and the source country
can both benefit on net at the expense of numerous 'third' nations, each of which
however, bears only a small part of the cost.
Moreover, there is still less evidence to suggest that trade-related investment
policies currently exert an important independent influence on global patterns of
production and trade, especially in relation, say, to the remaining egregious and
well-documented barriers in textiles and apparel and in agriculture. As suggested
above, the main effect of many investment measures at least in the medium term is
to shift rents between the source and the host country.
The conventional argument for inclusion of investment measures within the
GATT framework thus appears to rest on shaky ground, while any favourable
influence on global efficiency of GATT efforts is in any case limited by the
agreement to focus exclusively on the trade-distorting effects of such measures.
Moreover, the decision to tackle investment measures primarily on the basis of
their presumed role as nontariff trade distortions neglects important interactions
between trade restriction and direct investment as joint determinants of the global
pattern of production. Changes in trade policies have implications for foreign
investment decisions; conversely, the effects of trade policies on productive effi-
ciency and income distribution within and across countries depend crucially on the
extent of induced changes in foreign investment. National investment policies can
thus have an important though typically indirect influence on the consequences of
protection and of trade liberalisation.
For this reason, national investment policies may indeed be critical to the
success of the GAT' even though these policies in themselves do not constitute
important distortions of trade. Whether in the GATT or an alternative forum, the
need is for negotiations to limit the use of all efficiency-robbing national invest-
ment policies, not merely the subset designated as TRIMs.
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Developing New Rules and
Disciplines on Trade-Related
Investment Measures
Keith E. Maskus and Denise R. Eby
1. INTRODUCTION
N deciding to pursue negotiations in the Uruguay Round on rules and disci-
plines covering trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), the contracting
parties of GATT set themselves a highly complicated task.' Because there is little
international consensus even over how broadly to define TRIMs and what their
effects on trade and welfare may be, reaching a comprehensive agreement among
very many countries that effectively disciplines the use of TRIMs seems an elusive
goal. Indeed, in discussing conflicts in the negotiations, one analyst stated flatly
that, 'TRIMs ... now seem the least likely candidate for a sustained confrontation,
partly because the political and technical costs of enlarging the GAT to deal with
them seem prohibitive...., 2
This assessment may be overly pessimistic. In our view, there is scope for at
least a limited agreement on TRIMs that could, for the first time, elevate the most
directly trade-distorting investment restrictions into the purview of GATT disci-
pline. The limits would come in two dimensions. First, rather narrow coverage of
TRIMs included in any agreement is likely. Second, the agreement could reflect
some combination of limited country membership, reminiscent of the Tokyo-
Round Codes, and minor provisions for special treatment for developing nations.
If this assessment proves accurate, the resulting narrow agreement will invite
controversy over whether it promises to liberalise investment and trade on net and
whether and for which countries it will raise economic welfare. To anticipate this
KEITH E. MASKUS is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Colorado, Boulder,
Colorado, USA. DENISE R. EBY is a doctoral candidate in economics at the University of Colorado.
' We are grateful to Alan V. Deardorff. Robert M. Stern, and John Whalley for their comments on an
earlier version of this paper.
2 See Abreu (1989). It should be noted that Abreu allowed that some of the concerns surrounding
TRIMs negotiations could be covered by an agreement on services.
debate somewhat, our position is that an agreement of this nature may be defended,
apart from its expected welfare effects, as an important first step in sensitising
GATT members to the links, presumably deleterious, between TRIMs and trade in
goods and services. The eventual payoff to beginning this process could come in
subsequent multilateral or plurilateral negotiations. Further, if such an agreement
were to establish rules covering the investment policies of the industrial countries
and several of the newly industrialising countries, it would extend GATT disci-
plines to the great bulk of foreign direct investment flows. In itself, such an
outcome would provide substantial liberalisation benefits.3
With this background, in this paper we pursue three interrelated areas of inquiry.
We first discuss the bewildering complexity involving TRIMs. Relevant issues
include reasons for the xistence of TRIMs, their definition, specific practices of
concern, and what costs and benefits they may provide. We then consider the
capabilities of existing GATT mechanisms to discipline TRIMs and to provide a
framework for a subsequent agreement. We subsequently discuss the question of
the forms that a prospective agreement might take. Building from a description of
the current status of the negotiations, we attempt to characterise the outlook for
developing new rules and disciplines on TRIMs.
2. BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OP TRIMS
We keep the treatment of underlying analytical issues as brief as possible
because they are not the focus of this paper. Nonetheless, it is important to note
several background questions in order to inform the later policy discussion.
A brief exploration of the reasons that TRIMs exist might provide insight on
prospects for their control through multilateral agreements. In general, nations
consider TRIMs to be important components of broader economic policy regimes
designed to pursue such goals as industrialisation through import substitution,
technology development and diffusion, skill acquisition -and entrepreneurship,
local employment, regional development, and export expansion.
Thus, there may be clear linkages between TRIMs and broader policies, such as
infrastructure provision and commercial regulation. As one example, performance
requirements may be imposed on subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in order
to redirect the rents that these firms would enjoy from a local market protected by
import barriers. These firms would have little incentive to engage in local technol-
ogy improvements or technology transfer, or to improve productivity and quality
in order to break into export markets. In this context, host-country governments
may be reluctant to dismantle their TRIMs without due regard for appropriate
changes in wider policy regimes, a complicated prospect at best.
' A similar view is expressed by Graham and Krugman (1990).
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More specifically, distinct policy objectives are often listed as motivations for
TRIMs. A primary motivation is to maintain a degree of policy sovereignty and
local control over the rents from indigenous resources. Others include industrial
development (including industry structure and firm size), technology transfer, and
mitigation of difficulties in the balance of payments. TRIMs may be considered
countervailing tools to commercial policies in source countries that may block
market access for exports from host countries. Most controversially, TRIMs are
advocated to counter the market power and commercial abuses ('restrictive busi-
ness practices') of multinational enterprises through bargaining over terms and
codes of conduct. Such abuses are perceived to include, inter alia, transfer pricing,
excessive use of foreign inputs, deficient technology transfer, monopoly pricing,
and monopsony hiring. In this view, TRIMs may be sensible policies in the
naturally distorted second-best world characteristic of foreign direct investment.
Finally, TRIMs simply may be protective devices for local interests.
It is one thing to develop a set of TRIMs policies that may be targeted at such
disparate objectives. It is quite another thing to demonstrate that such policies
operate as desired and result in welfare increases in host countries. Most econo-
mists would argue that unless TRIMs policy is designed with unusual precision and
foresight, there is a strong presumption that systemic inefficiencies from these
policies would be generally harmful in both host and source economies. Further,
there are liable to be more efficient means, at least in principle, to pursue the
objectives specified earlier. And the imposition of thorough market restrictions
covering foreign investment is likely to generate substantial resource waste
through rent seeking behaviour. Thus, though there is no general logical guarantee
that TRIMs damage welfare in host countries and though there is little reliable
empirical evidence on this point, there is a basic presumption in that direction.
This case has been made repeatedly by governments in industrial countries,
primarily the United States, seeking to improve access of their firms to foreign
markets and to offset expected distortions in global trade patterns. However, the
argument has fallen largely on unresponsive ears, especially in developing coun-
tries. Two primary notions persist strongly in many capital-importing countries
that make their resistance to significant decontrol f foreign direct investment
virtually inviolable. First, the fear remains that less regulation carries risks of
substantial losses in sovereignty and a surrender of economic control to foreign
interests, which may be too high a price for any apparent growth benefits. Second,
the belief continues that a freer market for investment and trade would yield
suboptimal levels of technology transfer and a sustained condition of lagging
economic development.
These basic fears surely exist in all countries, since all are prospective recipients
of foreign direct investment. Nonetheless, their manifestation in TRIMs is rela-
tively greater in chronic capital-importing countries, which include some industrial
countries (e.g., Australia), but are primarily developing nations. Thus, it is roughly
accurate to characterise the TRIMs issue as one divided along North-South lines,
though the more appropriate continuum along which to divide countries is by their
relative levels of equilibrium capital and technology imports and exports.4 In this
regard, the probability that a comprehensive agreement on TRIMs may be reached
across the broad spectrum of countries depends in part on the dubious prospects for
convincing developing countries of the irrationality of their basic concerns.
3. TRIMS AND TRADE DISTORTIONS
As mentioned above, TRIMs are complex. The initial complexity lies simply in
the definitions of TRIMs. Adopting the language of the Punta del Este Declaration,
TRIMs might be defined as any incentives or disincentives to investment that have
'... trade restrictive and trade distorting effects' (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 1986). This focus on trade-restrictive and trade-distorting (TRD) ef-
fects leaves considerable scope for identifying TRIMs.
A narrow definition of TRIMs would be those measures clearly designed to
influence trade volume or trade patterns. Such measures include export perfor-
mance requirements mandating that a minimum level of output be exported and
local content regulations stipulating that a minimum amount of inputs be sourced
domestically. Indeed, this limited interpretation is consistent with most analytical
treatments of TRIMs.5 The definition is straightforward because of the direct link
between the investment policy and the resulting trade impact. It also bears the
greatest likelihood of yielding international agreement on the nature of TRIMs.
In contrast, a broad definition of TRIMs would include any government policies,
including macroeconomic, regional, employment, and industrial policies that
could result in an international pattern of investment and trade that would not
emerge in private competition among firms. Such an interpretation, while valid in
covering the full extent of potential linkages among investment policies and trade,
is nonetheless too broad to be useful in procuring an international consensus on
TRIMs. No country is willing to subject its broadest industrial policies to multilat-
eral review and discipline.
To understand the range of TRIMs at issue in the Uruguay Round, consider a
condensed form of the extensive list of TRIMs initially specified by the US
It is noteworthy that, as the United States has moved toward a net capital-importing position in the
1980s. the interests of Congress have shifted toward imposing performance requirements and review
mechanisms such as those embodied in proposed modifications to the Exon-Florio amendment to the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. A reasonable interpretation of growing Japanese
and European interest in a TRIMs agreement is that they see it primarily as a deterrent to additional
US intervention, rather than as an important curb on the actions of developing countries.
s See Greenaway (1989). Davidson, Matusz, and Kreinin (1985), and Grossman (1981).
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delegation to the negotiations. That submission characterised the following prac-
tices as investment measures that could distort trade.6
1. Local content requirements specify that a minimum volume or value of inputs
or percentage of the value of local production be procured from sources in the
host country.
2. Export performance requirements mandate that a minimum volume or value
of output or percentage of output be exported.
3. Trade balancing requirements link an investing firm's exports of output to its
imports of inputs in some way, say by requiring that the firm sustain a
minimum trade surplus.
4. Product mandating requirements demand that a finn supply specified markets,
typically in the host country but also in other countries, with output produced
only in designated local facilities.
5. Domestic sales requirements specify that an investor produce certain goods
for the local market.
6. Manufacturing limitations place restrictions on the amount and types of
products that can be produced in local affiliates in order to reserve the market
for locally owned firms.
7. Technology transfer and licensing requirements compel the investor to trans-
fer specified technologies on noncommercial terms, perform particular levels
or types of research and development locally, or license production in the host
country, often with limitations on royalties paid.
8. Remittance limitations restrict the ability of investors to repatriate earnings
from an investment and may also control foreign exchange allocations for this
and other purposes.
9. Local equity requirements specify that a minimum percentage of a firm's
equity must be owned by local investors.
10. Investment incentives provide financial advantages, such as tax limitations,
duty remissions, and subsidies, or inducements for foreign investors to locate
facilities in the host country. In general, such incentives are offered to offset
the negative effects of the various performance requirements imposed.
This list is apparently the widest categorisation of TRIMs that has been ad-
vanced for potential discipline. It therefore serves as a useful reference for
discussing the scope of the problem in a number of dimensions.
' See US Trade Representative (1987). For another comprehensive list but with a functional
classification of TRIMs, see Guisinger and Associates (1985).
The fundamental question concerns the trade distortions caused by these
measures. It is apparent that all of them bear the potential to distort international
commerce in some degree. The first three measures may be considered directly
trade-distorting in the sense that such distortion is their primary intent. Binding
local content restrictions, for example, are designed explicitly to limit imports
below levels that firms would choose in an unconstrained optimum, while trade-
balancing requirements may directly affect both imports and exports. Indeed, in
many respects these measures have efficiency and welfare effects that correspond
closely to more familiar (and more transparent) trade interventions, such as import
quotas and export subsidies. (Greenaway, 1989; and Grossman, 1981.) There is,
accordingly, a strong prima facie case, as developed below, that conventional
GATT disciplines may be brought to bear on them.
Possible trade distortions emerging from the other TRIMs on this list are less
direct but self evident nonetheless. Thus, for example, manufacturing requirements
can influence decisions on production location of various goods, thereby affecting
trade patterns, while licensing and equity requirements can alter the firm's per-
ceived tradeoffs between the net benefits of licensing and exports. Remittance
limitations may affect a firm's decision to enter or withdraw from a specific market
and result in a suboptimal global distribution of production and trade.7 It should be
noted also that the threat of facing newly imposed performance requirements once
a facility is in place can alter current decision making about location.
The distinction between direct trade impacts and indirect trade impacts of
TRIMs is central to the multilateral negotiations. Some consensus has emerged that
GATT has competence over those policies with direct trade-distorting intent. The
remaining question is whether such policies are to be prohibited (Graham and
Krugman, 1990). There is far less agreement about the GATT's potential role in
disciplining the broader, indirect measures. In part, this discord reflects concern
about the implications of extending GATT's purview to measures that many
countries regard as lying within the realm of domestic regulatory and competition
policy.
It also reflects disagreement over the extent of trade distortions that may result
from investment regulations. In principle, any investment policy distorts the global
and national allocation of capital and, therefore, affects trade. The issue becomes
how fully the investment distortions are translated into damaging trade
misallocations.
That TRIMs may distort trade is indisputable but the empirical evidence that
existing measures in fact have resulted in significant distortions is limited and
hardly conclusive.s In large part this is due to endemic difficulties in measuring the
For a fuller discussion of such potential distortions, see OECD (1989).
$ See OECD (1984, 1989), Guisinger and Associates (1985), and US Department of Commerce
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relation of TRIMs to investment decisions and subsequent trade flows, for several
reasons.
First, the existence of a performance requirement or an investment incentive in
a particular case does not imply that the requirement is binding or that the incentive
was decisive in attracting the investment. Indeed, most foreign direct investment
surely takes place based largely on broader market and commercial considerations.
Second, firms have incentives to misstate the extent to which TRIMs alter their
behaviour or influence their profits, either forproprietary or strategic reasons or for
the purpose of not irritating host governments. Third, specific TRIMs may in-
fluence investment and trade decisions at numerous, subtly interrelated, levels,
including investment location, plant size, technology, input mix, marketing, and
distribution, implying that a measure of the distortion is hard to develop. Fourth, in
general equilibrium, the panoply of TRIMs may be largely offsetting in effect,
resulting in no major net economic distortions.
Finally, it is difficult to know what the true counterfactual experiment should be
in measuring the trade effects of a particular TRIM. The elimination of a local
content requirement in one country, for example, may serve to attract investment
from another country where such a requirement is also in place or to shift economic
activity within the firm to fulfil a secondary restriction that now becomes binding.
Accordingly, it is difficult to assign an index of trade distortion to various national
measures.
a. Broader Welfare Aspects of TRIMS
Whatever the aggregate evidence, however, it is surely true that specific firms
have encountered demands from specific countries for TRIMs that have altered
investment, production, and trade decisions in ways that have raised costs. The
perception by important multinational enterprises that host governments have used
TRIMs to limit market access, either directly or indirectly through favouring other
competitors, or to force them into less profitable commercial situations, is suffi-
cient to generate policy concerns in source countries. So, also, is a belief by
specific labour interests that foreign investment incentives artificially attract
managers in source countries to shift production activity overseas. Accordingly,
there are ample justifications for source-country governments to argue for changes
in the way TRIMs are imposed and for the establishment of disciplines on their use.
In this regard, several characteristics ofTRIMs beyond possible trade distortions
are worth noting. First, as the list of identified TRIMs would suggest, these
measures leave considerable room for arbitrariness in their application. Restric-
tions may be imposed on or negotiated with potential entrants in a secretive,
opaque fashion that leads to discrimination across firms, uncertainty about future
changes in requirements and incentives, rent seeking, and other costly outcomes
that diminish any benefits from TRIMs and discourage efficient entry and oper-
ations. The arbitrary setting of standards and the resulting lack of transparency are
frequently cited by multinational enterprises as costly inconveniences.
Second, TRIMs may be applied in a discriminatory manner between domestic
firms and foreign investors. For protective reasons, governments often do not
provide national treatment in or equal access to their investment measures. A third
aspect of TRIMs worth mentioning is that, more than are other commercial policy
interventions, performance requirements and fiscal incentives are often forthcom-
ing at subnational jurisdictions, such as US states and Canadian provinces. This
situation raises concerns over the abilities of federal governments to ensure that
investment policies are consistently applied, transparent, and nondiscriminatory. It
also introduces the potential for uneconomic competition for foreign investment
based on the strength of subnational interest.
These broader concerns suggest that a narrow focus on the trade distortions
caused by TRIMs is misleading in welfare terms. The more significant problems
lie in the potential for structural damages to the trading system itself, including
discrimination, uncertainty, rent seeking, and the loss of policy control. Further, as
TRIMs proliferate over time they tend to lock the global economy into an increas-
ingly inefficient, and perhaps more rigid, capital distribution.
4. TOWARDS A TRIMs AGREEMENT
The foregoing analysis suggests that, despite the inherent uncertainties about the
actual efficiency and welfare effects of specific TRIMs, there are sound economic
reasons for erecting international disciplines over their use. In this section we
describe the essential features of a framework for a potential GATT agreement to
achieve this purpose and discuss the negotiating efforts to date in light of this
framework. We also note why consensus on a TRIMs agreement across the large
majority of GATT members will be difficult to secure.
The negotiating mandate on TRIMs, as adopted at Punte del Este, states
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1986):
'Following an examination of the operation of GATT articles related to the
trade restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations
should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to
avoid such adverse effects on trade.'
This language suggests that an agreement would incorporate three broad themes.
First, the mandate recognises that some existing GAT articles may be used to
discipline TRIMs. Second, it acknowledges that new disciplines may be required.
' According to the International Monetary Fund (1985) and the OECD (1989), during the 1980s
many countries have scaled back their use of TRIMs and also have made greater use of rules-based
mechanisms in recognition of this frustration and to ease access to external financing and foreign
direct investment.
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Third, it constrains the process to focusing on removing and avoiding the trade
effects of TRIMs, rather than pointing conclusively at the TRIMs themselves.
a. Relevant GATT Articles
A review of the GATT articles suggests that several of them provide potential
disciplines.10 It may be argued that certain TRIMs are prima facie violations of
specific obligations accepted by contracting parties. This case is most clear with
respect to local content regulations, which act as protective devices for domestic
production of intermediate inputs. Accordingly, they violate Article III, Paragraphs
1 (the principle that internal regulations may not be used to favour domestic
production), 4 (the commitment to provide national treatment for imports with
respect to internal regulations), and 5 (the prohibition of domestic processing
requirements favouring home input supplies). Indeed, Article 111:4 was the basis
for the 1984 GATT ruling against Canada's local content requirements under the
Foreign Investment Review Agency (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
1984). Article 111:5 appears to be a direct prohibition of local content requirements,
whether applied to domestic firms or subsidiaries of multinational firms.
It seems that these provisions, in conjunction with the Canadian precedent,
could be used as grounds for disputing the GATT consistency of the local content
regulations of any contracting party. In this regard, the TRIM itself appears to be
subject to GATT prohibition. Similar comments apply to requirements that are
imposed in a discriminatory way across investment applicants from various con-
tracting parties, thereby violating the most-favoured-nation principle, though the
discipline invoked could only eliminate the discrimination involved, ratherthan the
TRIM itself.
With respect of the trade impacts, a less straightforward case may be made that
domestic content requirements, by limiting imports below undistorted levels, are
in violation of two other GATT principles. First, by acting as import barriers they
provide additional protection beyond negotiated bound levels, thereby nullifying
or impairing benefits provided through other concessions. Second, a complainant
could argue that content requirements act as quotas or similar quantitative trade
barriers, in violation of Article XI (elimination of quantitative restrictions). The
language in Article XI is broad enough to sustain such an argument.
A case for appeal to existing GATT articles for relief from other directly
import-reducing TRIMs can also be made. Trade-balancing requirements, for
example, could result in artificial restrictions on imports, thereby protecting do-
mestic firms. Accordingly, they would appear also to violate Articles 1I:1, 111:4,
and XI, plus be potentially problematic from the standpoint of national treatment
" For other reviews, see Fontheim and Gadbaw (1983), Greenaway (1989), and US Trade
Representative (1987).
and the most-favoured-nation principle. This argument has been extended to
manufacturing limitations, product-mandating requirements, and sales restrictions
by some contracting parties in the negotiations.
Export performance requirements, however, are less clearly violations of GATT
conventions beyond any discriminatory applications contravening the most-
favoured-nation principle. It has been argued that such requirements run afoul of
Article VI (anti-dumping and countervailing duties) by inducing firms to lower
export prices in discharging their obligations. If firms sustain a higher domestic
price to offset this cost and markets remain segmented, authorities in foreign
markets may find dumping to have occurred. However, Article VI provides only
for the levying of an offsetting duty; there is no language suggesting that the
performance requirements themselves are actionable. Further, since this remedy is
available there is little need for injured countries to pursue a case based on
impairment of their own tariff schedules.
In combination with fiscal incentives, however, minimum export requirements
could conceivably be construed as indirect export subsidies, which are banned by
Article XVI:4 on non-primary products if they result in lower cxport prices than
home prices and by Article XVI:3 on primary products if they result in 'more than
an equitable share of world export trade.' The logical link here is simply that the
fiscal incentives provide the wherewithal to meet the export requirements, result-
ing in a de facto export subsidy. Article 9 of the Subsidies Code is relevant here as
well. Note also that this argument could be applied to trade-balancing requirements
with incentives if the causation is that firms choose to export more than optimal
amounts in order to increase their imports.
A general GATT principle that might be presumed to be violated by directly
trade-distorting TRIMs is that governments should not undertake policies that
force trade decisions to be made on grounds other than simple commercial con-
siderations (Article XVII:l(c) on state trading enterprises). Indeed, this principle
formed the basis of the complaint against Canada's negotiations of export perfor-
mance undertakings and was part of the case against its local content requirements.
In reviewing the case, however, the GAT' panel found that Article XVII serves
only to clarify obligations in cases in which government regulations are applied on
a discriminatory basis, ruling in favour of the export requirements. Accordingly, in
future cases this principle could only be applicable in cases where national treat-
ment is clearly violated in the imposition of TRIMs. Conditional upon such a
finding, the principle presumably could be used further to discipline local content
regulations and other import-reducing restrictions, while its use against export
minimums would be more difficult. 11
" 'The Panel found that there is no provision in the General Agreement which forbids requirements
to sell goods in foreign markets in preference to the domestic market.' (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 1984).
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The preceding paragraphs described TRIMs that might be construed to be
clearly inconsistent with existing GATT obligations. Such TRIMs presumably
would be subject to prohibition or substantial modification to offset the associated
trade impacts. Because these measures have directly trade-distorting intent, there
seems to be a logical basis for an agreement recognising their qualification for
GATT disciplines.
Other TRIMs may also be argued to contravene GATT provisions to the extent
that they indirectly result in adverse trade effects. Thus, for example, exchange
restrictions clearly could function as defacto quantitative restrictions on imports,
thereby running counter to Articles XI and XV:4 (the latter provision stating that
contracting parties should not employ exchange restrictions to 'frustrate the intent
of this Agreement'). Technology transfer requirements and licensing requirements
could favour local procurement and production over imports, presumably violating
Article III as explained earlier. Remittance restrictions might divert demand for
inputs to local sources by forcing firms to spend available capital in the host-
country market. Related scenarios about potential TRD effects of all TRIMs, either
singly or in combination, could be specified with varying degrees of force. To the
extent that such TRD effects exist in fact, the Punta del Este Declaration seems to
provide latitude for developing means to offset them.
Most analysts would view the foregoing arguments as constituting a straightfor-
ward and believable case for applying GATT mechanisms to a fairly broad
spectrum of TRIMs. Again, the proposition that nearly all investment measures
could affect trade decisions and, therefore, could damage the trading interests of
other countries is virtually undeniable. Nevertheless, there remains substantial
debate over whether existing GATT provisions may be used against TRIMs, even
the directly trade-distorting varieties.
The counter argument runs in stages. First, the Punta del Este mandate referred
only to the trade effects of TRIMs, not the measures themselves. A strict interpre-
tation of this language would not allow consideration of any disciplines on TRIMs,
despite the apparent implication that such an approach could be largely ineffective.
Second, the legal basis for disciplining the TRD effects ofindirectTRlMs is absent,
in this view. The GATT simply has no competence to review remittance restrictions
or local equity requirements, for example, because these are measures designed to
protect national sovereignty over domestic policies. That trade distortions could
result from them is secondary to the importance of domestic objectives. In any
event, it is liable to prove virtually impossible firmly to ascribe particular trade
impacts to the operation of such policies. Further, the case that GATT is relevant
even for directly trade-distorting TRIMs could be disputed on the grounds that,
despite the broadness of its language in certain provisions, the General Agreement
is designed only to discipline border measures. A related point is that the GATT
has rarely invoked prohibition as a general discipline, preferring instead to provide
for remedies and countermeasures to offset the effects of offending policies.
Third, the GATT allows numerous exceptions to a variety of its obligations,
including exemptions for safeguarding the balance of payments, promoting devel-
opment objectives, and preserving national security and health. Thus, even if
TRIMs were construed to be inconsistent with GATT, sufficient leeway exists in
the document to validate their use, perhaps in the great bulk of cases.
It is apparent from this description that the view that GATT already has the tools
to discipline some TRIMs is not unanimous. By themselves, the exceptions for
development purposes essentially eliminate the potential for applying GATT
mechanisms to investment policies in developing countries.12 Thus, any workable
TRIMs agreement must consider the elaboration of new provisions specific to
investment policy.
b. A Framework for New Disciplines and Procedures
The thrust of these disciplines must be, according to the Punte del Este Declara-
tion, to avoid the TRD effects of TRIMs. Inevitably, in our view, such avoidance
must mean in some cases the disciplining of the TRIMs themselves. Thus, a
TRIMs agreement would comprise a consensus over which measures are action-
able and to what extent and under what circumstances they may be disciplined.
Additional machinery would be needed for purposes of notification and surveil-
lance, but dispute settlement would proceed according to standard GATT
procedures. Finally, limited provisions for special treatment of developing coun-
tries may need to be entertained.
With this background, a reasonable proposal for an agreement on TRIMs might
proceed as follows. First, the classification used earlier could be the basis for
establishing levels of discipline for different forms of investment measures. Speci-
fically, an initial task would be to agree on the identification of those TRIMs that
are directly and intentionally aimed at distorting trade. A minimum list of such
measures would include local content requirements, trade-balancing requirements,
and export performance requirements. The first two measures would be deemed
inconsistent with GAT' provisions as discussed earlier, while agreement would
need to be reached that the last measure is an unacceptable requirement to export
for reasons other than strictly commercial considerations.
Despite the difficulty in showing conclusively that such measures result in
substantial TRD effects in specific cases, there is a general presumption that they
distort trade. Further, the trade effects could not be removed without eliminating
the TRIMs themselves. Hence, the initial agreement would crect a prohibition
against such barriers, with their reduction and elimination proceeding according to
" In fact, the panel ruling on Canada's investment case stated that countries could, in principle,
invoke Article XVmT.c (government assistance to promote economic development) to validate local
content regulations. See Graham and Krugman (1990).
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some negotiated timetable. It seems that the scope of these prohibitions need not
be extended to investment incentives because proscription of the TRIMs them-
selves should obviate the need for such incentives.13
Keeping the list of prohibited measures to a minimum seems important for the
purpose of procuring widespread agreement. Other TRIMs are not directed speci-
fically at trade levels and so are not clearly inconsistent with GATT provisions.
Nonetheless, they may be expected to interfere with trade in some fashion. Thus, a
second category of TRIMs could be established in which TRD effects would be
actionable on a case-by-case basis. We would argue for imposing on the complain-
ant a rigorous standard for demonstrating the existence of damages from such
measures, given the nature of investment policies as domestic prerogatives. This
procedure should eventually create an effective hierarchy across TRIMs, with
manufacturing limitations, sales requirements, and product mandates likely to
attract disciplines, while licensing requirements, technology transfer requirements,
and remittance and exchange restrictions would likely result in fewer successful
actions, sustaining their viability as perceived development policies.
More specific issues arise with respect to the operation of proposed disciplines.
The elimination of directly trade-distorting measures would require a notification
system in which each contracting party would designate its TRIMs in this category
for reduction over some time period. Once notified, the level of restrictiveness of
the measure (e.g., a requirement that 50 per cent of the value of output be exported)
would be bound and subject only to diminution. Other contracting parties would be
granted the right to notify the GATT of TRIMs in this category in any particular
country in preparation for consultation and, perhaps, dispute settlement.
Negotiators could settle on varying time periods for elimination of prohibited
TRIMs across countries, with the least developed countries having substantially
longer windows for adjustment than those provided to the industrial nations and the
newly industrialising countries. Indeed, it might be sensible to allow phaseout
periods to vary across TRIMs as well, depending on the perceived sensitivity of
particular measures for domestic purposes and domestic political interests. Note
also that it might be necessary to allow contracting parties to implement new
TRIMs during the phaseout period to avoid discriminatory treatment between new
investments and old investments operating under existing measures, though both
old and new TRIMs would be subject to elimination.
Elimination would be expected for TRIMs applied to both foreign and domestic
investors without discrimination and would cover policies resulting both from
general laws and regulations and from discretionary negotiations. The fact that
private domestic and foreign investors had acceded to demands for TRIMs would
" In cases where trade performance levels are not required but receipt of an incentive is contingent
upon meeting trade targets, the incentive should, in principle, be actionable under existing GATT
provisions covering subsidies.
not be allowed as an indicator of the nonrestrictiveness of the measures. Further,
subnational governments would be expected to respect prohibition and other
disciplines. Finally, to the extent feasible, contracting parties would agree not to
implement new measures during the phaseout as a form of standstill.
Regarding other TRIMs, a clear expectation would establish their use on a
most-favoured-nation basis and should not result clearly in adverse trade effects.
The agreement should contain a general commitment for notification of such
policies in the interests of transparency. Should notification prove too costly for
poorer countries, an alternative commitment to provide full information upon
receipt of a legitimate complaint through the GAT from another contracting party
would be appropriate. Again, other contracting parties would have the right to
notify GATT of such TRIMs in any country.
Some procedures would apply to both categories of TRIMs. Thus, for example,
dispute settlement would advance through the usual GAT channels, allowing for
any changes in those procedures to emerge in the Uruguay Round talks. Dispute
settlement would progress through consultation, the formation of a panel in sub-
stantive cases, and the issuance of the panel's findings. If necessary, some form of
compensation or rebalancing of concessions at the final stage would be envisioned.
It would also be useful for the GATT to provide periodic reviews of TRIMs
policy in the various contracting parties in order to deter the introduction of new
measures and to promote transparency. In our view, it would be desirable to handle
this surveillance through the existing GATT Secretariat rather than to create a new
'TRIMs Committee' that has been advocated by some contracting parties. Such a
committee could be seen by certain developing countries as an attempt to create an
international regulatory body for investment that would go beyond any reasonable
purview for the GATT and would be liable to do the bidding of the capital-export-
ing countries.
An agreement along the preceding lines presumably would find consensus
among most of the industrial countries and the newly industrialising countries. In
itself, this achievement would be noteworthy in that many of these countries
employ various forms of the TRIMs at issue. However, because resistance to an
extension of GATT authority to TRIMs is strongest among developing countries,
some accommodation of their interests is necessary if they are to join the agree-
ment. At the first level, this accommodation would consist of well-defined
exceptions, tied to levels of economic development and perceived difficulties of
adjustment, to the proposed disciplines. Thus, the poorest developing countries
would be awarded the longest time periods in which to eliminate their TRIMs in
the prohibited category, while temporary derogations in the forms of new TRIMs
might be allowed in certain circumstances. Indeed, varying elimination and adjust-
ment periods across countries and policies might be established by GAT', subject
to sustaining nondiscrimination as closely as possible. Further, developing coun-
tries might appeal to generic GATT exceptions (quantitative restrictions,
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balance-of-payments difficulties, development needs, and security) in the consult-
ation and dispute-settlement stages to justify their measures, even those in the
prohibited category. Again, such measures should be understood to be temporary,
nondiscriminatory and, to the extent possible, designed to avoid significant adverse
TRD effects. Permanent exceptions to negotiated TRIMs obligations would be
disallowed.
It is hoped that by allowing such limited exceptions and by imposing rigorous
standards of demonstration on complainants, the bulk of developing countries will
be induced to join the agreement. In many quarters, however, there is strong
opposition to any disciplines on investment policies as intrusions on domestic
sovereignty and an invitation to greater exploitation by multinational enterprises,
with perceived consequent negative effects on development.
At the second level, then, an attempt must be made to convince major capital-
importing developing countries that joining the agreement will provide them with
net benefits. Undoubtedly this task would be difficult, but some arguments may be
made in its favour. First, the case must be made that the use of highly restrictive
TRIMs is counterproductive to development efforts. Gradual liberalisation of
TRIMs may be expected in most scenarios to attract more foreign direct investment
and technology as firms react to more open and less opaque policy regimes.
Further, such investment would likely provide greater efficiency gains than current
flows that may be induced by the combination of protected markets, incentives,
and performance requirements. This possibility would be enhanced by more
general liberalisation of surrounding trade and industrial policies in host countries.
Such arguments are unlikely to prove persuasive on their own. Hence, the
second, and more problematic, arm of this task would be to convince developing
countries that investment liberalisation would be rewarded with greater market
access in the developed countries. This factor points to a limited TRIMs agreement
adopted in concert with a broader set of Uruguay Round agreements with linked
concessions across important areas. The obvious candidates in this regard include
agreements by industrial countries to pursue some liberalisation of their textile and
apparel quotas and agricultural support policies. Further, a commitment by these
nations to act more responsibly in enacting safeguards, both within and outside the
confines of GATT provisions, could carry substantial weight among developing
country negotiators. The various Uruguay Round agreements may also attempt to
recognise the complementaries among restrictive policies in investment, services,
and intellectual property in a way that results in an acceptable convergence of
interests across contracting parties.
c. Difficulties in Procuring a Wide Agreement
It remains to be seen whether recommendations for such linked concessions may
prove persuasive for developing countries and politically acceptable for industrial
countries. Because no bargains of that nature have yet been broached, however,
attention focuses on prospects for a TRIMs agreement on its own terms.
On that score, there is little room for optimism about a comprehensive accord
that would address the issues advanced above. There remains a wide chasm
between the positions of the major industrial nations and several of the hard-line
developing nations. Regarding the issues, the industrial countries, led by the
United States, continue to push for elimination and prohibition of most categories
of TRIMs, with tight restrictions on available exceptions for development pur-
poses. On the other hand, several developing countries, led by India and Brazil,
insist that no TRIMs be subject to prohibition and that any measures that might
otherwise violate general GATI'obligations be accorded full exemptions as devel-
opment policies. A number of peripheral issues divide these two sides as well.
These positions are clearly incompatible. It is conceivable that the expressed
preferences are merely bargaining chips that may be deployed successfully in a
compromise TRIMs agreement at the end of the day. The strong suspicion,
however, is that an accord with firm disciplines would be unacceptable to this
group of developing countries while a weak understanding with broad and perma-
nent derogations would be rejected by the industrial countries.
As we stated earlier, what may well emerge instead from the negotiations is a
limited agreement among most developed countries and certain middle-income
and newly-industrialising countries, with other nations joining depending partly on
their views of the viability of any exception provided. Since such an arrangement
would be dominated by the industrial nations, it seems likely that it would carry
features similar to their negotiating positions. The form of such an agreement
would likely be a code on TRIMs in which member nations would commit
themselves to prohibit some subset of the TRIMs discussed earlier and to erect
mechanisms for dispute settlement and the like. Other countries may find it in their
interests to accede if it seems that membership would attract new foreign invest-
ment and if the agreement is linked to other relevant GAT' concessions.
5. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conclusion of a GATT investment code would carry certain risks. Such
codes are inherently discriminatory and may redirect resources away from non-
members. They tend also to contribute to the general erosion of respect for the
multilateral trading system.
In this case, however, we believe that a code with strong disciplines would likely
be beneficial in the long term. The agreement would cover the great majority of
direct foreign investment if it included simply the major developed countries.
Additional membership by the Eastern European GAIT members and such indus-
trialising countries as Mexico and South Korea, while hardly guaranteed, would
v's
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subject a substantial portion of remaining foreign investment to discipline. In itself,
this outcome could provide substantial liberalisation benefits.
Two additional features point toward future gains. First, it is likely that more
countries will choose accession as their need for foreign direct investment grows.
Second, the agreement could pave the way for more thorough and rewarding
multilateral approaches to investment policies. In this light, even if the TRIMs
initiative fails altogether in the Uruguay Round - a strong possibility - it may
increase awareness of the issue that could be usefully marshalled at a later date.
The TRIMs negotiations inspire a broader observation about the GA'T, with
which we conclude. Growing foreign direct investment is part of the ongoing
internationalisation of business activity, including also trade in information and
technology, joint ventures, and related competition. This global competition inevit-
ably encounters distortions in trade and investment when its regulation is left to
national authorities. The GATT, devoted to developing disciplines on border trade
controls, is poorly equipped to take on the role of an international regulatory
agency. Yet the new issues in the Uruguay Round, national policies on investment,
intellectual property, and services, are fundamentally concerned with the interna-
tional effects of domestic regulation or competition policy. Since these issues lie at
the heart of national sovereignty and development policy it is unsurprising that
firm multilateral agreements should prove elusive to reach. Perhaps those analysts
interested in the international aspects of competition policy should consider what
forms of institutional change may be required to accommodate the resulting
problems for foreign trade.
Guisinger, S. E. and Associates (1985), Investment Incentives and Performance Requirements, New
York: Praeger.
International Monetary Fund (1985). Foreign PrivateInvestment in Developing Countries', Occa-sional Paper No. 23, Washington, DC; IMF.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1984), International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises: The 1984Review of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions, Paris:OECD.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1989), International Investment andMultinational Enterprises: Investment Incentives and Disincentives and Effects on International
Direct Investment, Paris: OECD.
United States Department of Commerce (1982), The Use of Investment Incentives and PerformanceRequirements by Foreign Governments, Washington, DC; USDOC.
United States Trade Representative 1987), Submission of the US to the Negotiating Group on
Trade-Related Investment Measures', Washington. DC.
REFERENCES
Abreu, M. de P. (1989), 'Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations',
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 21-46.
Davidson, C., S. J. Matusz and M. E. Kreinin (1985), 'Analysis of Performance Standards for Direct
Foreign Investment', Canadian Journal of Economics, 18, 876-890.
Fontheim, C. G. B. and R. M. Gadbaw (1983), 'Trade-Related Investment Requirements', in Bart S.
Fisher and Jeff Turner, eds., Regulating the Multinational Enterprise: National and International
Challenges, New York: Praeger.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1986), Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round
(Geneva: GATT).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1984), 'Canada - Administration of the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act: Report of the Panel adopted on February 1984', GA'T: Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents 30th Supplement, Protocols, Decisions, Reports 1982 to 1983 and 39th
Session, Geneva: GAIT (March).
Graham, E. M. and P. R. Krugman (1990), 'TRIMs in the Uruguay Round', forthcoming in J. J.
Schott, ed., Completing the Uruguay Round: A Results-Oriented Approach to the GATT Trade
Negotiations, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Greenaway, D. (1989), 'Why are We Negotiating on TRIMs?' manuscript.
Grossman, G. (1981), 'The Theory of Domestic Content Protection and Content Preference', Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 96, 583-604.
c
rn

